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This thesis focus on the credit dimensions of monetary policy. The topic has been
an area of active research since the nancial crisis of 2008 and 2009. The chapters can be
grouped in terms of the questions that motivated them. For the rst and the second, it
was "Why do Central Banks in emerging market economies intervene in credit markets
in response to external shocks?", while for the third the question is more general "Why
do Central Banks intervene in credit markets?".
In Chapter 1, we describe that, during the nancial crisis of 2008-2009, to respond
to a sudden stop in capital ows, many central banks in emerging market economies
relied on credit policies. We build a quantitative small open economy model to study
these credit policies. The main innovation of our setup is the presence of two imperfect
credit markets, one domestic and the other international, and of two types of rms. The
exporter is assumed to have access to both credit markets, while the wholesale rm can
only borrow in the domestic market. During a sudden stop, exporters, faced with higher
spreads for international credit lines, repay part of their foreign debt, tap the local
market for funds and cause spreads to increase in the domestic market. This increases
nancing costs for all rms, causes a deterioration of the balance of payments and
depresses output. Calibrating the model to match Brazilian data, we assess the e¤ects
of two policies implemented by the Central Bank of Brazil: (i) lending to exporters
using previously accumulated foreign-exchange reserves and (ii) expanding credit in
order to reduce spreads in the domestic market. The model suggests that both policies
probably raised GDP, but that the latter may well have decreased welfare. Moreover,
had the central bank not been able to use foreign reserves as the source of funding,
lending to exporters would also have reduced welfare.
In Chapter 2, we expand our focus to the fact that, during the crisis, the emerging
markets economies faced a large decline in their terms of trade and an increase in
the interest rate they could borrow from abroad. As their counterparts in developed
economies, policymarkers intervened in credit markets. A common ground behind the
interventions seems to be failures in the banking system. We build a quantitative
small open economy model with domestic nancial intermediation to study these credit
policies. The main innovation of our setup is the presence of a domestic banking system.
In this structure, four main channels link external shocks to the nancial sector: (1) the
protability of the export sector, (2) asset prices, (3) banks borrowing cost and (4) the
balance sheet position of banks as they hold foreign currency denominated debt. For
the calibration we consider, based on Brazilian data, the domestic nancial sector has
the largest amplication e¤ect in response to an increase in the international interest
rate and the corresponding decline in assets price is the main channel. Hence credit
interventions are most powerful in response to this type of a shock, reducing by 30
In Chapter 3, we rst note that a number of recent theoretical papers show that
margins can a¤ect asset prices. Such results are important, for example, to understand
the unconventional polices implemented by the Fed during the great recession of 2007-
2010. However, empirical evidence is still scarce. We contribute to ll this gap. We
show that an aggregate margin-related factor is able to predict future excess returns of
the SP 500 and that stocks with high exposures to the cost of buying on margin pay
on average higher returns.
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1Chapter 1
The Credit Dimension of Monetary
Policy: Lessons from Developing
Economies under Sudden Stops
1.1 Introduction
The1 nancial crisis of 2007-2009 pushed monetary authorities far beyond the
traditional management of interest rates. Central banks around the world felt the need
to supplement their conventional policies with strategies designed to alleviate adverse
1This Chapter was co-authored with João M. Salles. We thank Michael Woodford for the invaluable
guidance and support provided throughout the duration of this project. We also wish to acknowledge
the detailed and insightful comments of Ricardo Reis, Carlos Eduardo Gonçalves, Marc Giannoni,
Veronica Rappoport, Guillermo Calvo, José Alexandre Scheinkman, Bruce Preston and Stefania Al-
banesi, as well as thank JaeBin Ahn, Alexander McQuoid, David Grad and Marcos Nakaguma for
taking the time to read and criticize several versions of this paper. The inestimable assistance with
data by Fábio Barbosa, Sérgio Werlang and Silvia Valadares was essential for the nal product. Fi-
nally, we are also grateful to the participants at the Columbia University for their questions, comments
and criticisms. All the usual caveats apply.
2conditions in credit markets. Emerging market economies, in particular, bu¤eted as
they were by large reversals in foreign credit ows, engaged in a variety of specically
targeted credit policies (see Ishi, Stone, and Yehoue 2009). The case for these types
of policies, however, remains contentious among practitioners. And there is even more
controversy about the justication, in terms of economic theory, for the exceptional
measures undertaken by so many central banks. Here, we aim to contribute to this
debate by building a quantitative small open economy model to study the credit policies
adopted by developing countries in response to sudden stops in capital inows.
The main innovation of our model is the presence of two imperfect credit markets,
one domestic and the other international. This allows us to capture an important nan-
cial market segmentation present in many emerging economies: while most rms can
borrow domestically, only some types of rms have access to foreign credit. Moreover,
shocks to the foreign supply of credit a¤ect not only international spreads but domestic
spreads as well, as rms that previously relied on credit from abroad are forced to tap
the local market to a greater extent. The increase in both spreads raises nancing costs
for all borrowers in the economy and depresses output.
In this economic environment, we use our model to assess the implications of two
common types of credit policies that were embraced across emerging market economies,
during the crisis. The rst was the liquidity provision to the export sector. The fact
that in the data, as well as in our model, exporters are the main class of rms that
have access to foreign borrowing is crucial in an analysis of this type of measure. The
second policy adopted was an expansion of credit by central banks intended to lower
domestic spreads across the board. This latter type of intervention was also common
in advanced economies. What is special about emerging economies is that the policy
was implemented in response to a major tightening in international credit conditions
that generated a sudden stop in capital inows. Acknowledging the link between the
3external shock and conditions in the domestic credit market turns out to be essential
for both policies.
In order to clarify this, we posit an economy populated by households, a nan-
cial sector and four types of rms: wholesale, trading companies, retail and capital
producing. The key aspects of the model are related to the nancing of rms in the
wholesale and trading sectors. Wholesale rms combine physical capital and labor to
produce home goods. Since they own the physical capital, wholesalers require funds
to operate. Trading companies instead specialize in the export market: they acquire
goods from domestic producers and sell them abroad, at no additional cost, to foreign
consumers. They also require funding because they receive the corresponding payments
only with a delay. In the same vein as the nancial accelerator literature (Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999), the nancial frictions in our model imply that rms rely
mostly on debt contracts to adjust their capital structure. The main di¤erence here is
that they can, at least in principle, borrow either domestically or from abroad.
In the domestic market, which we model, like Cúrdia and Woodford (2010c) and
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), through a costly loan production technology, both
rms can borrow at the same rate. However, in the international market, as is common
in developing countries, some rms face more favorable foreign credit supply conditions
than other rms operating in the same economy. To simplify the model, we assume
that only the trading rms have access to foreign credit markets at all.
A variety of observations support our assumption that exporters have access to
foreign credit at more favorable terms, at least in emerging market economies2. First,
2A number of market participants in Latin America also point out that trade nance o¤ers better
terms because the essentiality of international trade shields the repayments of trade-related lines from
being blocked by exchange rate centralizations and other heteredox measures. This widespread view
is based on the history of past currency crises in Latin America, where local governments always made
e¤orts to guarantee that trade credit obligations were honored. We would like to thank those who
took the time to explain to us this aspect and other features of trade nance related products.
4in the banking literature, Berger, Klapper, and Udell (2001), Stein (2002), Mian (2006),
Gormley (2010), among others, show that foreign-owned nancial institutions, as well
as large banks, tend to nance only the largest and most protable rms. Combined
with the well-established view in the modern trade literature that rms operating in
the export-import sector tend to be larger, better organized and more sophisticated
(Melitz 2003), these papers suggest that lending to rms engaged in international trade
is usually viewed as a safer market, which foreign banks can supply more easily, either
directly or through local banks3.
Second, in our model, trading rms require funding because exports require ad-
ditional working capital, as foreign customers make payments with a one-period delay.
Therefore, in the model, we associate international borrowing with trade nance credit
lines. The literature on the topic (for example, Amiti and Weinstein 2009) has empha-
sized, among other aspects, the higher working capital requirements associated with
international transactions. A recent theory of trade nance by Ahn (2010) suggests
that, due to screening advantages, foreign lenders of working capital to rms in devel-
oping economies should specialize in providing trade nance to exporters4.
Finally, banks do not take on currency mismatch risk when lending to exporters
in emerging economies. This explains the existence, in normal times, of a highly com-
petitive credit market, with many specialized players, in which trade nance becomes
a low-risk, low-reward proposition (Korinek, Le Cocguic, and Sourdin 2010).
With asymmetric access to international credit, a sudden stop of capital ows
3Cho, Krishnan, and Nigh (1993), for instance, show that foreign banks operating in the US tend
to specialize in trade nance.
4In addition, according to the World Bank Global Development Finance Report (2004), "Partic-
ipation in international trade can help less creditworthy countries and rms expand their access to
nance. Banks are more willing to lend when traded goods are available as security." Cetorelli and
Goldberg (2010) show the importance of trade nance as a transmission mechanism of the 2007-2009
crisis. For a more complete discussion of bank structuring of trade nance, see Manova (2010).
5impacts di¤erent agents though di¤erent channels. The exporters are directly a¤ected
as they can no longer obtain the cheap trade nance credit lines from abroad, and hence
see a signicant deterioration in the terms at which they can borrow. As a consequence,
they reduce their activity, decrease their foreign debt, and tap the domestic market for
funds. The wholesale rms are indirectly a¤ected, because the additional demand for
funds from exporters increases domestic spreads and interest rates. In response to a
higher borrowing cost, these rms reduce production and cut back investments. Finally,
as exporters repay their foreign debt, the exchange rate depreciates, further reducing
domestic consumption and investment.
In light of the importance of these nancial channels, credit policies are arguably
important tools for central banks dealing with sudden stops. Given that the Central
Bank of Brazil has been a prominent example of the use of unconventional policies5,
we calibrate our model using Brazilian data, and o¤er a (simplied) case study of the
recent crisis in this country6. We start by establishing that the models mechanism is
able to capture the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables during the crisis of 2008-
2009. In particular, the model can replicate the rise in both international and domestic
spreads, as observed in the data. Then we perform a series of counterfactual analyses to
assess the importance of the credit policies implemented by the Central Bank of Brazil.
Our main ndings are the following. First, providing credit to exporters is an
e¤ective tool. Our simulations indicate that it reduced spreads and that both GDP and
5Calvo (2006), for example, suggests that some of these alternative policies, especially the central
bank involvement in the credit market for exports rst implemented by Brazil in 2002, and then again
in 2008-2009, have had signicant e¤ects in terms of reducing the economic and social costs of these
crises.
6As shall be further explained below, we assume away some important aspects of the crisis. In par-
ticular, Brazil, as most emerging economies, was also hit by a large terms of trade shock. Abstracting
from this shock a¤ects the ability of the model to match some aspects of the crisis, but allows us to
focus on the role of credit policies in response to a sudden stop.
6welfare were higher as a result of the credit policy. Essential to this conclusion is the
fact that the central bank funded its intervention entirely from previously accumulated
foreign reserves. The economic intuition supporting the e¤ectiveness of the policy is,
then, straightforward: the credit facility provides a cheaper alternative of foreign credit
to the exporters during the crisis. It should be emphasized, however, that in our analysis
the central bank provides credit at the prevailing market price. Therefore, any benets
come from the general equilibrium e¤ects on spreads, as exporters reduce the amount
of debt contracted with the private sector.
To be able to provide an alternative line of credit, the central bank needs to
have foreign-exchange reserves available at the time of the intervention7. Had they not
been fully-funded out of reserves, credit facilities to exporters would reduce welfare in
our model. In this case, targeting credit to exporters would still provide them with
the incentive to repay their foreign debt. But, without the use of foreign reserves, this
movement would also accelerate the exchange rate depreciation and, hence, ination.
When the central bank cares about these variables, as they most likely do after all,
many emerging market economies adopt an ination targeting regime the policy ends
up reducing welfare.
Second, with respect to the policy aimed at the domestic market more generally,
our results are not as favorable. Even though the intervention is e¤ective in reducing
domestic spreads due to general equilibrium e¤ects, the impact on welfare can be neg-
ative. By reducing domestic spreads, the central bank distorts the incentives of agents
in favor of domestic debt. This increases, for instance, the repayment of foreign debt by
exporters. Similarly to the case without the use reserves described above, when nom-
7To be precise: the central bank has to have access to foreign resources that are not subject to
the same spreads available to private agents. Previously accumulated foreign reserves, IMF loans or
currency swaps with the US Federal Reserve are examples of funding. In our model, all of these sources
of funding would have the same e¤ect.
7inal rigidities are taken into account, the resulting capital outow can reduce welfare
through their e¤ects on the exchange rate and, consequently, on the ination rate8.
Finally, we show that, in the absence of domestic nancial frictions, the central
bank has no reason to implement any credit policy. In this case, the only factor that
matters is the use of foreign-exchange reserves. To make this point clear, we compare
two policies: one in which extending credit to exporters is fully-funded out of foreign
reserves and another in which the central bank sells foreign reserves in the spot market,
with the proceeds transferred to households (through a reduction in the government
debt or an immediate tax rebate). If we consider an economy with perfect domestic
nancial markets, the two policies are equivalent. Moreover, even when we assume
that domestic spreads are positive, but constant, the two policies have almost identical
e¤ects. The intuition is a simple one: without frictions, it does not matter where in
the economy the central bank injects resources, because they will always end-up where
they are most needed. These results underline that we need to take account of key
institutional features of the economy, such as the observed increase in domestic spreads
during crises, to correctly consider the implementation of credit policies.
These ndings suggest two broader lessons for credit policies in emerging economies.
The rst is that domestic frictions matter for the design of credit policies. Although it
should be obvious, this is a relevant point to make for the case of emerging markets,
where policies were implemented in response to a negative shock to the international
8There are other reasons to intervene in the domestic market, such as releasing liquidity to avoid
potential bank runs. These, however, are beyond the scope of our model. The banking literature - as
well as the Lehman bankruptcy experience - has illustrated the importance of acting conscientiously
in that dimension. Implicitly, we assume that the banking system is not directly impacted by the
sudden stop. We understand this can be a strong assumption, but one that allows us to highlight
the importance of the credit policies in dealing with sudden stops, regardless of the specic secondary
e¤ects of the crisis on domestic nancial systems. It is also important to point out that there were no
major bankruptcies in developing economiesnancial sectors.
8borrowing conditions faced by these economies. Furthermore, with few exceptions, most
of the literature on sudden stops (see references below) has focused exclusively on this
international dimension of credit market frictions and ignored the empirically observed
presence of domestic frictions. Our results show that such a narrow focus can be mis-
leading, as one could erroneously conclude that there is no need at all for credit policy
and only the use of foreign-exchange reserves matters.
The second broader lesson says that the mere fact of an increase in credit frictions
does not necessarily imply that central bank credit policy will raise welfare. In fact, our
simulations suggest that intervening only in domestic credit markets, or engaging in
more general credit policies without the necessary backing of foreign-exchange reserves,
is not a good recipe for dealing with sudden stops in capital ows. Note that in both
cases, the policies are successful in achieving their goal of reducing credits spreads.
Nevertheless, they reduce welfare because of their negative impact on the exchange
rate and ination.
This point is worth emphasizing because policies designed to act exclusively upon
the ine¢ ciencies of the domestic nancial markets are exactly the ones recommended
in most works focused, for example, in the case of the US economy9. Cúrdia and
Woodford (2010a) show that if the condition that "all investors can purchase arbitrary
quantities of the same assets at the same market price" is violated then credit policy can
improve welfare. That condition is violated in our model, but still credit interventions
to reduce domestic spreads can reduce welfare. What our results show is that those
policy recommendations depend further on the details of the nancial structure that is
assumed. For many developing countries su¤ering from sudden stops in capital inows,
given the structure of their economies, the most e¤ective credit policies are of a di¤erent
9Some examples are Geanakoplos (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Cúrdia and Woodford
(2010a).
9type. Credit targeted at the more a¤ected sectors in a developing economy mainly
the export-import rms, which use more foreign borrowing to fund their operations 
can be quite helpful during a crisis, as long as the central bank funds these loans with
reserves hoarded before the crisis.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. After relating our
work to the literature in the nal part of this introduction, we review Brazils crisis
experience through the lens of its key macroeconomic variables. Section 3 presents
the details of the model and its baseline calibration. In Section 4, we perform a crisis
experiment, rst using the baseline calibration and taking as given the credit policies
implemented in Brazil. Then, in the same section, we perform a series of experiments,
under di¤erent assumptions, to discuss the mechanism of the crisis, the importance of
the policies and provide two broader lessons for credit policies in emerging markets.
Section 5 concludes.
Relation to the Literature
Our work contributes to three branches of the literature. First, our approach,
which allows nancial intermediation to play a fundamental role in the macroeconomy,
is part of a renewed e¤ort by monetary economists to integrate the insights of nancial
economics into their policy evaluation frameworks (Brunnermeier 2009). Until recently,
it had become common to consider monetary policy as consisting solely of interest rate
policy, and to analyze alternative policies in models that abstracted from the alloca-
tive role of nancial intermediation. Woodford (2003) stresses that, by the time his
manuscript was published, few central banks still used credit controls or other meth-
ods to "directly regulate the ow of funds through nancial markets and institutions"
(p.15). Such controls would, it was believed, distort the relative cost of funds to dif-
ferent parts of the economy in ways that would negatively impact the central banks
10
overall objectives10.
Recent events have brought a renewed focus on unconventional monetary policies.
This in turn has required renewed attention to credit market imperfections. Cúrdia and
Woodford (2010b) raise this point clearly, stating that the usual policy prescriptions,
based on concern for stabilization of ination and real GDP alone, may "be inadequate
to circumstances of the kind recently faced". Important recent contributions to this
literature include Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009), Cúrdia and
Woodford (2010a, 2010b, 2010c), Reis (2010), Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and
Kiyotaki (2010), Geanakoplos (2010) and Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2010).
Our results conrm that taking credit frictions into account can be important.
Credit interventions seem to have been an e¤ective countercyclical, welfare-improving
policy during the nancial crisis of 2008-09, in emerging economies. However, our analy-
sis also suggests that some interventions can reduce welfare. Therefore, the implication
of our work to this literature is that the desirability or undesirability of credit policies
depends crucially on detail of their implementation.
Second, we contribute to the literature on sudden stops in emerging economies.
Even though the use of credit policies in the most recent episode can be considered a
novelty, sudden stops in international capital ows have been a xture in the history
of developing economies. And, following Calvo (1998), much has been said about how
countries handle the existence of such an exogenous shock. However, most of the liter-
ature has focused exclusively on the nancial frictions related to the foreign nancing
of economic activity in emerging markets. Some examples are Cook (2004), Céspedes,
Chang, and Velasco (2004), Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2006), Devereux,
Lane, and Xu (2006), Cúrdia (2008) and Braggion, Christiano, and Roldos (2009).
10Cúrdia and Woodford (2010a) discuss conditions under which central bank credit policy would
have no useful role to play.
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Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) develop one the few models that incorporates
nancial frictions in the domestic credit markets. Despite such an extensive body of
work, the policy instruments considered for counteracting credit market driven crises
have, nevertheless, remained quite restrained, with the interest rate instrument and
active management (or not) of exchange rates as the central elements of most analyses.
Moreover, as domestic nancial markets in many developing economies deepen
and central banks expand their policy options, such a narrow focus on the international
dimension of credit markets arguably, one of the fundamental issues over the 1990s
ends up limiting the usefulness of these models. In particular, few connections have
been made between the frictions in both domestic and foreign nancial markets and
their role as a channel for the transmission of sudden stops (one important exception
is Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2001). Here, we highlight this link.
Finally, we also contribute to the large literature on the accumulation and man-
agement of foreign-exchange reserves by developing economies. Some recent examples
are Calvo (2006), Jeanne and Ranciere (2006), Aizenman and Lee (2007), Jeanne (2007)
and Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010). To the best of our knowledge, we are
the rst to show in a quantitative macro model that using foreign reserves to provide
credit to exporters during a sudden stop can improve welfare.
1.2 The Crisis in Brazil
Despite some early signs of tightening in the international capital markets in the
rst quarter of 2008, reected in the growing spreads on foreign loans to Brazil, the
country continued its course of economic expansion as GDP, investments and consump-
tion growth sustained their fast pace (gure 1a). The beginnings of a global meltdown,
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even with the rst few bank failures in the UK and the US, were not enough to change
the outlook for the economy, as was emphasized by the Brookings Institution panel on
Brazil (2009). Economic decoupling dominated the news. Perhaps even more telling, in
hindsight, was the Brazilian Central Banks decision to keep raising overnight interest
rates to control demand-driven ination (gure 1b).
The reigning chaos in global nancial markets, strengthened by the bankruptcy
of Lehman Brothers in September, completely changed the prevailing scenario. Brazil
was, once again, coupled with the world. International spreads more than doubled
in a single quarter, while the domestic credit spreads increased by 400 basis points
over the same period (gure 1b). GDP started falling over the fourth quarter, as real
investments collapsed and aggregate consumption reversed course11.
The most common diagnostic suggests that the crisis reached Brazil through two
main channels (Pastore and Pinotti 2008, Stone, Walker, and Yasui 2009). The rst of
these was the negative impact of worldwide nancial crisis, which pushed the country
towards an unexpected sudden stop on incoming international funding, including trade-
related lines of credit. The second conduit was the global recession itself, in particular
the slowdown in China, which reduced the demand for commodity exports and, hence,
commodity prices. As a consequence, Brazil was subject to a terms-of-trade shock that
limited the use of exports as an exit strategy for the crisis.
Faced with the prospect of disruption in the economy, the Brazilian Central Bank
aggressively cut the economys short-term interest rate in response to the declines in
activity and ination. In addition, it elected three main lines of defense, which were
established concomitantly and implemented in several steps throughout the duration of
11Many emerging market economies went through the same process, as highlighted by Ishi, Stone,
and Yehoue (2009), Yehoue (2009) and several references cited therein. Brazil is a very representative
member of this group.
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the crisis12.
First, the monetary authority decided to reduce banking reservesrequirements
across the board, in order to infuse the domestic banking system with liquidity and re-
duce the lending rates charged by banks. It also designed some targeted reductions in
reserves requirements geared towards small and medium-sized banks. These were car-
ried out through government-incentivized acquisitions of the loan portfolios of smaller
banks by the ve largest privately-owned nancial institutions in the country. In total,
these measures13 amounted to about 142 billion reais (about 75 billion US dollars at
the time).
The second line of defense was established to deal with the shortage of external
funding. Through the sale of dollars with repurchase agreements starting in late Sep-
tember and auctions of US dollars (USD) against dollar-denominated collateral, which
began in October of 2008, the central bank announced the provision of USD 34 billion
to the Brazilian rms operating in the international markets. The total amount actually
sold was closer to USD 25 billion and involved mainly exporting companies.
The third announced objective of the Brazilian Central Bank was to reduce the
volatility of the exchange rate. To achieve this goal, the monetary authority acted
directly in the spot market for foreign currency, selling over USD 14.5 billion of its
massive stock of foreign-exchange reserves. It also intervened in the derivatives market,
announcing the auction of swaps, in which the central bank took the short position
12The Treasury also put into practice a hefty agenda of countercyclical scal policies. While these
may have been important, we choose not to include them in our experiments in order to better frame
our credit policy analysis.
13The government-owned banks also aggressively increased their loan portfolios during the crisis.
The Brazilian development bank, BNDES, was particularly active, providing long-term lending to the
corporate sector. Although in line with the credit policies we study here, proceedings governing the
lending decisions by these government-owned banks lack transparency and include some subsidies 
especially in the case of the BNDES that we dont consider in our model, as they do not generalize
to other economies.
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against the dollar, of over USD 50 billion but actually implementing only around
USD 12 billion.
As gures 1a and 1b show, the nal toll of the crisis can be viewed as moderate
and short lived. The economy presented negative growth rates for two quarters, but
GDP, consumption and investment had already begun to recover by the second quarter
of 2009. Domestic and international spreads remained high throughout most of the
rst half of 2009, but below their peak levels. In the second half of that year, the
spreads started to decline and, in the domestic case, returned to their previous levels.
It is nevertheless important to point out that international spreads remain above their
pre-crisis levels.
Overall, the actions of the Brazilian Central Bank were viewed as successful,
even if empirically reliable evidence to support this view remains scarce. Our paper
contributes to the debate about the impact and importance of some of the policies
implemented. However, it is important to highlight that our main focus is to study
credit policies and its implications in the general context of an emerging economy facing
a sudden stop. Therefore, we abstract from some of the particularities, like the terms-
of-trade shock and the intervention in the exchange rate spot and forward markets, and
focus on the followings stylized facts of the crisis in Brazil:
1. An exogenous shock reduced the supply of foreign credit and increased interna-
tional and domestic spreads;
2. Real activity declined and remained below trend during a few quarters following
the shock; and
3. The central bank intervened in the trade nance market (the second line of defense
above) and in the domestic credit market (part of the rst line of defense above).
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1.3 Model
1.3.1 Outline of the Model
The core of the model is a standard small open economy with nancial frictions
and nominal price rigidities along the lines of Cúrdia (2008), Elekdag, Justiniano, and
Tchakarov (2006), and Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006). A key nancial friction in these
models is that rms can borrow abroad subject to constraints as in Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999) (henceforth, BGG). To deal with the dynamics of the crises of
interest and the policy responses, we extend these models in two key dimensions, both
related to nancial aspects.
First, we allow rms to also contract domestic debt by introducing through the
simple, but e¤ective mechanism of a costly loan production technology a local nan-
cial sector that, by its imperfection, generates credit spreads in the domestic market.
The existence of rms with access to both domestic and foreign nancial sectors is an
important feature of economies in which both credit markets are relevant. In addition,
the fact that nancial markets are imperfect in emerging economies should not come
as a surprise. The data also shows that these frictions become more important during
sudden stop episodes. In Section 1.2, we show that the domestic spreads in Brazil
increased signicantly during the nancial crisis of 2008-09. Gertler, Gilchrist, and
Natalucci (2007) document similar behavior for South Korea during the Asian crisis of
1997-98. In a qualitative model of collateral constraints, Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001) focus on the domestic nancial frictions during emerging crisis. In the quan-
titative model presented here, the domestic frictions are essential to understand the
design and implications of credit policies, in addition to helping us to match important
features of the data.
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By considering a single loan production technology in the domestic nancial
system, we are implicitly assuming that all rms are homogenous from the point of
view of a domestic bank. Hence, the domestic spreads are unique and depend only on
the total volume of domestic nancial intermediation. As a consequence, the demand
by rms for domestic and foreign credit depends mostly on the conditions they face in
the international markets.
This last observation brings us to the second key innovation in our model: ex-
porters are assumed to obtain loans from abroad at better nancial terms than the
ones that are available to other rms in the economy. This is a fundamental char-
acteristic of many developing economies. As discussed in the introduction, there are
three main reasons as to why exporters might have better access to foreign nancial
markets. First, international lenders may have a better understanding of the business
of exporters, which are usually larger and more transparent companies, than of rms
who mostly attend to domestic consumers. Second, foreign lenders may also prefer to
specialize in trade nance credit in emerging markets. Finally, the assets of exporters
are linked to the foreign currency and since foreign debt in developing economies is
almost always denominated in foreign currency, there is a smaller degree of currency
risk in lending to exporters.
Moreover, at least in normal times, exporters can obtain better funding abroad
than in the domestic credit markets14. For instance, Figure 2 shows the actual spreads
on loans provided by a number of Brazilian Banks through di¤erent lines of credit.
Noticeably, in periods of small spreads, the cost of credit to exporters, mostly through
trade lines, is considerably lower than the working capital lines available to equivalent
14Chapter 5 of the World Bank Global Development Finance Report (2004) shows that, for a set of
developing economies in which trade lines can be matched to comparable domestic nance loans, the
spreads on trade nance were (marginally) lower than their domestic counterparts. This is consistent
with the evidence we obtain from Brazilian banks.
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companies in non-exporting sectors.
Except for these two points, the underlying framework proposed remains fairly
standard. We construct a small open economy with identical households, which are
divided between workers and managers, a simple domestic nancial sector (or the mar-
ket for "domestic loans"), a market for loans from abroad (which we also label as the
"trade nance" market) and four types of rms: wholesale, retail, trading and capital
producing companies. We close the model with a government entity that combines the
roles of both Treasury and Central Bank, and the usual resource constraint on home
goods. The balance of payments, as always, reects the budget constraints of all the
actors. The details of the economy are spelled-out below.
Households
We assume that the households are composed of a constant fraction (1   f) of
workers and a fraction f of managers15. A worker provides labor to the wholesale rms
and returns her wage to the household, while a manager, as the name suggests, manages
one of the households rms and also returns her earnings ie, the prot of the rm
she manages to the family unit. The managers are further segmented according to
the type of rm they oversee. A fraction f  fe of the individuals within the household,
called "wholesalers", is responsible for running the wholesale rms, while a fraction fe,
of "exporters", takes care of the trading companies. Individuals can move between the
worker and manager groups. In particular, every period, a random fraction (1   w)
of the wholesalers and a fraction (1   e) of the exporters become workers. To keep
the fractions of each type constant, a number of individuals, also randomly selected,
15Our structure is similar to the one developed in Gertler and Karadi (2011), where the two types
are workers and bankers.
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become managers. Note that, even though the manager operates it, the household is
the actual owner of all the rms.
Within the household there is perfect insurance and, hence, all consumption
decisions are taken at the household level. However, all the professional transactions
between a manager and other agents in the economy, including those within the same
household, are done at arms-length. In the case of the nancial decisions of a rm,
the manager is considered an insider, while the household is an outside investor. This
approach allows us to include a rich variety of nancial frictions in the model while
keeping the convenience of having a representative consumer. In particular, the model
has two types of rms that rely on debt to fund their activities. The traditional "-
nancial accelerator" approach (ie, BGG) would require three types of individuals, each
with di¤erent consumption and labor decisions. Here, we also have three agents, but
only the household consumes and works.
When an individual becomes a manager, she receives a start-up equity (or net
worth) to initialize the operation of the rm. The size of the initial net worth and the
fact that a manager has a nite expected life implies that the rms always borrow debt
to nance their investments. All of the relevant decisions by the managers, such as
the nancing decision, the initial equity, the evolution of the rms net worth, and the
aggregate per period net cash ow payments to the households, shall become clear when
we discuss the problem of the wholesale and the trading companies. At this juncture, it
su¢ ces to say that a manager, when exiting the group, returns all remaining net worth
to the households.
There are two types of consumption goods in the economy: home goods (CH;t)












These preferences imply that the aggregate price index Pt, and the demands for










CF;t = (1  )PtCt
St
(1.4)
where St is the nominal exchange rate, dened as the domestic price of the foreign
currency, PH;t is the aggregate domestic price of the home good, and we normalize the
foreign price level to 1.
Besides the wholesale rms and trading companies, the households also own
retail rms, capital producers and nancial intermediaries. None of these last three
types of rms require capital to operate. In addition, households can buy government
bonds and make deposits with a nancial intermediary. These two nancial assets are
both risk free and, in equilibrium, perfect substitutes. We aggregate them into a single
variable Bt.
The consumption (Ct), bond holdings (Bt) and labor (Lt) decisions are given by





24 Ct   ~L L1+ t




with respect to fCt; Lt; Btg, subject to the budget constraint
PtCt + PtBt  WtLt +Rt 1Pt 1Bt 1 +f;t   Tt (1.6)
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where Wt is the wage, Rt is the interest rate received from holding one period bonds,
f;t is the aggregate net cash ow from all types of rms owned by the household and
Tt is a lump sum tax. Following a common practice in the emerging market literature,
utility is dened as in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu¤man (1988). This assumption
eliminates the wealth e¤ect on labor supply by making the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labor independent of consumption.
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where t is the gross ination rate and
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A continuum of identical wholesale rms, indexed by j, hire domestic labor (Lt)











For simplicity, we assume that capital completely depreciates in one period and,
hence, that investment at t is equal to the next period level of capital times the price of
the capital good: Kt+1PK;t. Capital is acquired from the capital producers. Their pro-
duction function and the determination of the price PK;t are described in the subsection
1.3.1.
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The wholesale rms are owned by the households and operated by the managers
within them (the wholesalers). A specic rm has two sources of funds: the internal
accumulation of prots and the debt contracted with the domestic nancial sector.
Let Nw;t(j) be a given net worth level of a wholesale rm j at period t. The
balance sheet constraint imposes that
PK;tKt+1(j) = PtNw;t(j) + PtDw;t(j) (1.11)
where Dw;t(j) is the amount of debt contracted specically by wholesale rm j. For
a given net worth, the maximization of the value of the rm described below and an
aggregate version of this balance sheet constraint determine the level of capital in the
wholesale sector.
The net worth of a previously existing rm is given by
PtNw;t(j) = Pw;tYt(j) WtLt(j) Rb;t 1Pt 1Dw;t 1(j) (1.12)
where Pw;t is the wholesale price of the home good and Rb;t is the gross interest rate
available to borrowers in the domestic market.










Substituting this demand curve and the production function (1.10) into (1.12), we get











is the return of investing in capital, which depends only on aggregate conditions. This
last property implies that the size of the rm does not matter and therefore, from this
point forward, we drop the index j.
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The wholesaler keeps accumulating assets in the rm until exiting the sector,
when all of the remaining net worth returns to the household. Therefore, an operating
rm chooses the path fKt+1g to maximize the expected terminal net worth. The value
of the rm (in real terms) is then given by






[(1  w)Nw;t+1 + wVw (Nw;t+1)]

(1.16)
where Nw;t evolves according to (1.14) and the manager uses the stochastic discount
factor of the shareholder of the rm, the household. Note that the value of the rm is
a weighted average of the value when the rm ceases to exist, the rst term above, and
the value if it remains in operation. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that the
value of the rm is a linear function of its net worth
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(1.18)
The solution to this maximization problem yields one of the two main equations
for the wholesale sector. Since the wholesalers take the time paths of the prices RK;t










where t+1 denes the current marginal value, in real terms, of one additional unit of





(1  w) + ww;t+1

(1.20)
The second main equation describes the evolution of the net worth in the whole-
saler sector. We make two assumptions. First, a manager who exits the sector returns
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all the remaining cash to the households. That is, at period t, all of the rms net
worth (1.14) is paid out as dividends. Second, the household provides a small fraction
w of total assets in the sector to the new start-ups. The aggregate evolution of the
net worth in the sector is then given by
PtNw;t = w [(RK;t  Rb;t 1)PK;t 1Kt +Rb;t 1Pt 1Nw;t 1] + wPK;tKt+1 (1.21)
Equations (1.19) (together with the specication of the domestic nancial sector)
and (1.21) determine the consolidated debt level and the aggregate evolution of the net
worth in the wholesale sector.
Retail Firms
A continuum of retail rms, owned by the households, indexed by i 2 [0; 1],
buy the home good from the representative wholesale rm and transform it, with a
linear technology and at no additional cost, into their own variety. Firms operate in
a monopolistically competitive environment and prices are sticky à la Calvo. Every
period, rms reset their price with probability (1  p).
The total aggregate demand for the domestic good is given by
YH;t = CH;t +KH;t+1 + C

H;t + H;t (1.22)
where CH;t is the demand from the domestic consumers, KH;t+1 is the investment de-
mand (determined at t), CH;t is the demand from foreign consumers and H:t is the
resource cost, denominated in terms of the home good, of nancial intermediation. The
demand from foreign consumers is given by
CH;t = C
  P H;t v (1.23)
24
where C is an exogenous shifter of the foreign demand for home goods, which here,
for simplicity, we assume is constant. The remaining two components of the aggregate
demand, KH;t+1 and H;t, are described below.
The nal home good is assumed to be a composite made of the continuum of
































((1  ) PH;t(i)  Pw;t+j) (1.26)
where we use the stochastic discount factor of the household.






















Finally, the aggregate domestic price index is given by
PH;t = [(1  p)( PH;t)1  + p(PH;t 1)1 ]
1
1  : (1.28)










The di¤erentiated retail goods are sold in domestic and international markets. In
the case of exports, we assume that the goods take one period to arrive in the customers
markets: a good sold and shipped in the current period arrives at its international
destination only in the next period. More importantly, foreign consumers pay for the
good only when they receive it.
Given this structure, we consider the case in which the trading companies special-
ize in the export market. In period t, they buy, sell and ship to international markets,
at no additional cost, each variety of the home good demanded by foreign consumers.
The price of the good they sell is determined at period t and is denominated in foreign
currency. Since they receive payments for their sale only at period t+1, trading rms
require capital to operate.
To support its activities, a trading rm has access to three sources of funding:
internal cash ow, debt in the domestic market and debt from abroad. The most
important characteristic of these rms is that they have access to credit from abroad
on favorable terms compared with other domestic rms. Here we make the assumption
that they are actually the only rms that have access to the international credit markets.
Trading companies are managed by individuals  the exporters  within the
household. Let Ne;t be a given net worth level of a trading company at period t. Since,
as in the case of the wholesale rm, size does not matter, we already omit an index to
di¤erentiate each exporter. The balance sheet constraint imposes that
PH;tC

H;t = PtNe;t + PtDe;t + StD

e;t (1.29)
where P H;t is the aggregate export price, C

H;t is the aggregate quantity exported, D

e;t is
the foreign debt, which is denominated in foreign currency, contracted by the exporter,
De;t is the domestic debt. For a given net worth, the maximization of the value of the
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trading company and the aggregate balance sheet determine the demand for CH;t (the
equivalent to investing in "capital" for the exporter).





H;t 1   St e;t 1RDe;t 1  Rb;t 1Pt 1De;t 1 (1.30)
where  e;t is the spread the trading rm pays in international markets and R
 is the
world risk free interest rate, which, to simplify the model, is assumed to be constant.
The value of the trading company (in real terms) is then given by






[(1  e)Ne;t+1 + eVe (Ne;t+1)]

(1.31)
where the maximization is subject to the balance sheet constraint (1.29) and the tran-
sition equation (1.30). The value of the trading company is given by an expression









  (1  e) + ee;t+1 (1.32)
where st is the real exchange rate.
The setup above results in three main equations for the export sector. First,
exporters take prices and the interest rates as given. In the equilibrium we consider here,
and in line with our discussion above, they always borrow in the international market.
However, they may decide not to access the domestic market. As a consequence, their



















17The trading company buys and sells each variety of the home good. Optimization implies that the
return, as given by expression (1.34), of selling one extra unit is the same for each variety i. Therefore,













where e;t+1 is dened as in (1.20).
The left hand side of the equation above is the risk-adjusted cost of borrowing
from abroad, while the right hand side is the correspondent measure for domestic debt.
When the cost of domestic debt is too high compared with what the exporter can get
abroad, condition (1.33) holds as an inequality and the domestic debt De;t = 0. We
consider that this is the "normal" case in the economy. However, during a crisis, when
there is a negative shock to the supply of credit from abroad, equation (1.33) will hold
as an equality and the exporter will also borrow domestically.
Second, the leverage decision of the exporter implies that the return, in terms of
foreign currency, of selling one extra unit of CH t the left hand side in the expression





Finally, as with the wholesalers, we assume that the exporter who exits the sector
returns all the remaining cash to the households, who provide a small fraction e of the
total "assets" in the sector to the new start-ups. These assumptions imply that the














Another important characteristic of developing economies is the use of imported
(capital and intermediary) goods as essential inputs for production. Capital goods and
inputs usually represent a substantial fraction of the overall imports in these economies.
Cúrdia (2008) and Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella (2003) provide a large amount of
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evidence and discuss the importance of this characteristic. When we calibrate the
model to match the data from Brazil, we allow for the composition of the (composite)
consumption goods to be quite di¤erent from that of the capital goods, which have a
larger share of imported inputs. Hence, changes to the prevailing exchange rate can
a¤ect investments much more signicantly than overall consumption.
To capture this e¤ect, we follow Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) and
















The price index for capital goods and the breakdown into domestic and foreign





















The international credit market is open (only) to exporters. Even though they
take prices as given, the premium  e;t is a function of the overall leverage in the export
sector










H;t and ~ 

e;t is an exogenous shock.
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In a model with asymmetric information between inside and outside investors
and costly verication, as in the BGG framework, the optimal decisions would imply
a positive relation between leverage and spread as in the equation above. Note also
that information frictions, and the heterogeneity in this aspect among sectors, is an
essential feature of our discussion about the di¤erent access of exporters and other
rms to international credit. In Cúrdia (2008), Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov
(2006), and Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) the authors follow the BGG approach and
include the information frictions explicitly in the model. Here, we simplify along that
dimension in order to focus on the sectorial heterogeneity and the interaction between
international and domestic credit markets (features that are absent in those works).
Therefore we follow a common practice in the real business cycle literature on emerging
markets with international nancial frictions18 and directly assume a functional form
for the international spread.
Domestic Market
The role of the domestic nancial system is to raise one-period, interest-rate-
bearing deposits from households and to make loans to rms that need funding the
trading companies and the wholesale rms. We assume that the market is imperfect
and, as a consequence, there is a spread between borrowing and lending rates. Following
similar approaches in Cúrdia and Woodford (2010c) and Goodfriend and McCallum
(2007), we consider a loan production technology that can capture monitoring and
management e¤orts in the nancial sector. In particular, to make a total real amount
of loans equal to Dt, banks consume, in the period the loan is originated,  (Dt) units
of real resources, measured in consumption goods. The function  represents a specic
18See, for example, Garcia-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010) and Neumeyer and Perri (2005).
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loan technology and is assumed to be equal to
 (Dt) = ~ (Dt)
 (1.41)
where ~ and  are parameters.
Note that we are implicitly assuming that all rms are homogenous from the
point of view of a domestic bank, and, hence, the domestic spreads are unique and
depend only on the total volume of domestic nancial intermediation. In our model,
the important sectorial heterogeneity is related to information aspects, in particular, in
the relation between foreign lenders and domestic rms. Our assumption here is that
domestic banks can equally assess the quality of all type of borrowers.
For the households, deposits in the banking system and government bonds are
perfect substitutes: one-period, nominal, risk-free bonds. Therefore, the deposit rate
equals the rate on government bonds Rt. The real prot of a representative nancial
intermediary is given by
fi;t = Rb;tDt  RtDh;t (1.42)
where Rb;t is the interest charged to borrowers in the domestic market; Dt = Dw;t+De;t
is the total amount of loans made to the wholesale and trading companies; and Dh;t is
the total amount of deposits raised from the households.
A ow of funds restriction imposes that the value of total deposits has to equal
the loan portfolio plus the resource costs associated with the loan origination
Dh;t = Dt + t (Dt) : (1.43)
Maximization of equation (1.42) subject to (1.43) implies that




The structure presented here allows us to incorporate, in a simple manner, a
spread between the domestic borrowing and lending rates. Moreover, this spread de-
pends on the volume of nancial intermediation. Finally, we also note that the spread
is the same for all types of rms. As a consequence, rms with favorable access to
external credit lines the exporters in our model will prefer to borrow from foreign
lenders, while the remaining rms will mostly use the domestic nancial system.
Government
The government is a single entity composed by the Treasury and the Central
Bank. Together, they control ve variables in the model: the nominal interest rate (Rt),
a lump-sum tax on households (Tt), the supply of domestic government bonds held by
households (Bg;t), the amount of foreign reserves (FAt) held as US Treasury Bonds,
for example and loans made to domestic rms as part of a credit policy (Dg;t). We
include foreign reserves in the model because some of the credit policies implemented by
emerging market central banks were coordinated with the management of their holdings
of foreign currency reserves.
We impose two restrictions on the government. The rst is a standard intertem-
poral budget constraint
Tt = Dg;t + StFAt   PtBg;t + (Rt 1Pt 1Bg;t 1  Rg;t 1Dg;t 1  RStFAt 1) (1.45)
where is Rg;t is the interest rate received by the Central Bank on its domestic credit
interventions.
The second condition restricts the interventions in the credit and bond markets
to be sterilized. That is, any change in the volume held of a specic asset on the
consolidated government balance sheet requires an equivalent change in the holdings of
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another asset or in the amount of government bonds on the liability side:
Dg;t + StFAt = PtBg;t: (1.46)
Imposing this last condition allows us to abstract from money in the model. It
is also a close description of the actual policies we study in this paper.
Taken together, these restrictions imply that the government has, at least in the
case of a exible exchange rate regime, three independent instruments: Rt, FAt and
Dg;t.











where R and Y are the steady levels of, respectively, the gross domestic interest rate
and output. The credit policies and the management of reserves are the topic of Section
1.4.
Exogenous Shocks
The only exogenous shock in the model is the ~ 

e;t term in the foreign credit supply
curve (equation 1.40). Movements in this variable capture changes in the conditions
available to exporters in the international credit markets. A sudden stop is a large
positive increase in ~ 

e;t such that, for any given level of leverage, the spread on the
foreign debt is higher. We assume that ~ 

e;t follows an AR(1) process in logs.
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Equilibrium
We close the model with the home good resource constraint and the balance of



















Aggregating the budget constraints of households and the government, and re-
placing the prot functions as necessary, one can derive the balance of payments (in
terms of the foreign currency)
P H;t 1C

H;t 1   CF;t  KF;t+1 = De;t 1 e;t 1R  De;t + FAt  RFAt 1 (1.50)
In the appendix A.1, we list all the equations that determine the dynamic equi-
librium of the economy. Of the fundamental equations, many are standard: consumer
Euler equation, labor supply, resource constraint and balance of payment. The core
of our model is given by the equations related to the nancial aspects of rms in the
wholesale and export sectors: equation (1.33) guides the exportersdecision about how
much to borrow domestically and abroad; equations (1.19) and (1.34).determine the
leverage (and, given the level of net worth, investment) in each sector; while equations
(1.21) and (1.35) present the evolution of each aggregate sectorial net worth. Together
with the characteristics of the nancial intermediation, equations (1.40) and (1.44),
these equations drive the propagation of the sudden shock in the economy.
19The resource contraint includes the price dispersion term because we use non linear methods to
solve the model. See the discussion in the expanded version of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2005).
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Eliminating the Financial Frictions
In this subsection we show how to eliminate the nancial frictions from the
model. This is particular important for the case of the domestic frictions because it
highlights exactly the additional assumptions of our model, when compared to the no-
domestic-friction standard in the previous papers of the literature. More importantly,
in the simulations of Section 1.4, we use the frictionless case presented here to show
how important the domestic frictions are to understand the role of credit policies.
We start by briey pointing out that one can eliminate the international nancial
friction by setting the debt-elasticity (e) of the spread in the foreign credit supply
curve (equation 1.40) close to zero20. This allows the domestic rate to di¤er from
the international interest rate but this di¤erence would be independent of the leverage
conditions in the export sector.
The economy has no domestic friction if we set ~ = 0 in equation (1.41) and
replace equations (1.21) and (1.35), describing, respectively, the evolution of the net
worth in the wholesale and export sectors, with two equations imposing that w;t =
e;t = 1. The rst condition eliminates any spread in the domestic debt market, while
the latter equations allow the rms to adjust their equity at any time.
In this case, the two following Euler equations, which can be derived from (1.18)






















20Setting e equal to a small positive value instead of zero ensures the independence of the deter-
ministic steady state from initial conditions (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2003).
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Finally, note that in the absence of frictions, the composition of domestic debt
and equity is not determined and is completely irrelevant. In the simulations below
with a perfect domestic market, we simply assume the steady-state level.
1.3.2 Solution Method and Calibration
A crisis in the model begins with an abrupt and unexpected increase in the
cost of foreign credit. Starting from the non-stochastic steady state, at period t0,
agents learn about the current realization and the future (deterministic) path of the
exogenous processes. To capture the occurrence of a sudden stop event, we consider a
large increase to the exogenous process ~ 

e;t in equation (1.40). This implies that, for
the same leverage at the rm level, the spread practiced on the foreign credit market
rises substantially.
To solve for the dynamic equilibrium, we use a shooting algorithm under the
assumption that the economy will return to its steady state after T periods. At every
period, one must check if the exporters debt condition (1.33) holds as an equality
or as a strict inequality. In the parametrization we consider here, the latter holds in
the steady state and, therefore, the exporters contract only foreign debt at that point.
However, when the shock hits the economy, the cost of international debt increases and
exporters start to borrow in the domestic market as well. In other words, the condition
will hold as an equality upon impact and will typically continue to hold as such for a
few periods after the initial shock.
We use an algorithm designed to control for just such an "occasionally binding
constraint". We rst guess that equation (1.33) holds as an equality from the period
tI to tN and solve the model. Then we check whether de;t  0 for all t 2 [tI , tN ] and if
(1.33) holds as inequality for t =2 [tI , tN ] (where de;t = 0). If not, we adjust the interval
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[tI , tN ] and start over.
The method described also captures the nonlinearity present in the model quite
well. Given that our stated objective is to study the e¤ects of large nancial shocks,
taking into account the nonlinearities is absolutely fundamental. Several recent papers,
including Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007), Braggion, Christiano, and Roldos
(2009) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009), have also studied crisis exper-
iments under perfect foresight using methods similar to the one we apply here.
A period in the model is a quarter and there are 22 parameters to calibrate.
Table 1 lists all of them and their calibrated values. For those parameters that we can
directly match to moments in the data, we use gures from Brazil, which is the focus
of our simplied case study.
First, we start with the description of the more conventional parameters, whose
values we take from the literature on nominal DSGE models calibrated or estimated for
emerging economies. We set the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
() to 1 and the inverse of the labor supply elasticity ( ) equal to 2. The value of the
export price elasticity (v) commonly varies from the fairly inelastic 0.6 in Cúrdia (2008)
and Cook (2004) to perfectly elastic in Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) and Braggion,
Christiano, and Roldos (2009). Perfect elasticity is also true for most of the papers in
the emerging market real business cycle literature, where the world is assumed to absorb
any quantity exported at the international price. Here we follow Céspedes, Chang, and
Velasco (2004), Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) and Elekdag, Justiniano, and
Tchakarov (2006) and choose a median value of 1. With respect to the nominal part of
the model, in line with the estimations in Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2006),
we use 2/3 for the degree of price stickiness (p) and 8 for the elasticity of substitution
across the di¤erent varieties of home goods ().
To calibrate the labor coe¢ cient in the production function (), the preference
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bias for home goods () and the share of home goods in the production of capital goods
(k), we use the Brazilian national accounts. These coe¢ cients are set, respectively,
to 0.80, 0.967 and 0.50 to match the GDP share of investment expenditures (0.20), of
imported consumption goods (0.02) and of imported capital and inputs (0.10). All these
shares were computed from post-1995 data, after the economy was stabilized by the Real
Plan. For the elasticity of substitution in the production of capital goods, we follow
Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) and consider a small degree of substitutability
(0.25). This is particularly important in the short time horizon of the crisis that we
consider here.
To obtain the leverage ratio of rms for the steady-state debt-to-assets ratio
of the wholesale rm (dw), we rst consider Brazilian rm level studies21 that have
computed an average ratio of debt-to-assets of about 0.35. These studies are, however,
somewhat outdated, with the most recent one covering rms only up to 2004. Since
then, the volume of corporate credit as percentage of GDP in the country has almost
doubled. Therefore, we consider a rate of 0.5, a number close to the value used by
Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006), which is itself based on rm-level studies for Asian
economies. In the case of trading companies, we set the steady state foreign debt-to-
assets ratio (de) to 0.97, which implies that the steady-state amount of export-related
trade nance credit lines equals 0.12 of the quarterly GDP. This is consistent with
the average value of trade nance debt in the data ranging from 2006 to 2010 and
represents approximately 1/5 of the total amount of foreign debt in Brazil. Note that,
in the steady state, exporters do not borrow in the domestic market (de = 0).
We now turn to the less traditional parameters regarding the nancial portion
of the model. The leverage ratios dw and de determined in the previous paragraph
21Terra (2003) and Bonacim, Ambrozini, and Nagano (2006).
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pin-down, respectively, the coe¢ cients w and e to 0.0047 and 0.00034. The fraction
of managers who stay in their group (w and e) are set such that the average life of a
rm is 10 years.
For given values of  and e, calibrating the two steady state-values for the do-
mestic and international spreads sets, respectively, the ~ term in the domestic credit
supply curve (1.6) and the ~ 

e coe¢ cient in the international credit supply curve (1.5).
For both rates, we consider proprietary data provided by four large cap banks operat-
ing in Brazil on the spreads charged on loans to top rated companies in the country.
In the case of the international spread, we use the main short term, foreign currency
denominated, trade nance credit line available to exporters. A rm can access this
credit line only if it provides not necessarily at the beginning of the loan proof
that they have performed an international trade transaction. For the domestic rate, we
compute the average spreads of working capital credit lines that are denominated in do-
mestic currency and have short term maturity similar to that of the trade nance line.
The average domestic and international spreads in the data set are, respectively, 2.4%
and 1.6% in annual terms, in the 2004 to 2007 period. This was a nancially and eco-
nomically stable time in Brazil and we use it as a proxy for a "non-crisis" steady-state
measure.
For the curvature of the international credit supplies, e, we set it to 1, a con-
servative level of spread-debt elasticity. This value implies that at the steady-state,
an increase of 1pp (percentage point) in foreign debt as a share of GDP raises the in-
ternational spread by 0.16pp. Garcia-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010) estimate this
number to be around 0.5pp. By assuming a smaller number, we are being conservative
about how much a decrease in the leverage of exporters against the international private
sector reduces the spread on its foreign debt. In the case of the domestic market (),
we assume in our baseline calibration that  = 22. This replicates the observed initial
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increase in the domestic spread during the crisis.
In terms of the Taylor Rule followed by the monetary authority in setting the
policy rate, we x  = 2 and y = 0:75. These values are common in the literature
and provide a good description of the exible ination target rule currently in place in
Brazil.
Furthermore, we choose to normalize, without loss of generality, the steady-
state value of output and the terms of trade to 1. The rst assumption determines
the household disutility of labor ~L, and the second sets the steady-state value of the
exogenous component in the foreign demand for domestic goods (Ct ). Finally, the
household time discounting () is set to equal 0.99. This results in a 4% annual domestic
policy (or saving) real interest rate, which, for simplicity, we also assume to be the
international interest rate.
Finally, for the exogenous process ~ 

e;t, estimating a simple AR(1) process for
the international spread statistics collected by the Central Bank results in an auto-
correlation coe¢ cient of 0.93. This value is consistent with the more elaborate law
of motion of sovereign spreads in Latin American countries estimated by Fernández-
Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe (2010). Therefore, we set the
autocorrelation of the shock to 0.9.
1.4 Crisis Experiment and Credit Policies
In this section, we conduct crisis experiments and study the scope for credit
policies by central banks. A crisis in the model begins with a large shock to the
exogenous process  e;t in the foreign credit supply curve (equation (1.40)). This shock
is able to produce a reversal on credit ows to an emerging market economy. We
start with simulations under the baseline calibration and with the implemented credit
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policies.
The initial shock to the foreign credit supply implies an increase, before any
adjustments in the economy, of 10 percentage points (pp) in the international spread.
In equilibrium, which take into account the variations in leverages and the implemented
credit policies, this implies an increase of 7pp in the international spreads in the rst
period of the crisis. This jump from a steady-state level of 1.6% is within the range
observed in Brazilian data during the nancial crisis of 2008-2009. The average rate of
trade nance credit lines to exporters, compiled by the Central Bank of Brazil, shows
that the spread peaked, in December of 2008, at 7.9%, or 6.4pp above the average
of 1.5% that prevailed over 2006 and 2007. Similar measures using the data from
privately-owned institutions further illustrate that, for rms with high credit ratings,
the maximum increase was 5.7pp, while it reached 8pp for rms with intermediate
ratings.
The main goal here is to assess the impact of the unconventional credit policies
on the evolution of the main variables in the economy and evaluate their welfare im-
plications. As described in Section 2, there were two main types of policies used in
Brazil, and these are representative of most of what was done in developing economies.
One was directed to exporters and denominated in US dollars, and the other provided
liquidity to the domestic banking sector to support their lending to rms. In our model,
we associate the former with a policy targeted to the trading companies and linked to
their trade nance borrowing, and the latter with a policy aimed at all rms borrowing
in the domestic credit market. More specically, the two types of policies above are
implemented in the model as follows:
Credit to Exporters: The central bank o¤ers a xed amount of a one period
loan, which is denominated in foreign currency and with the interest rate set in a
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competitive auction where only the exporters can bid. The auction process implies
that the interest rate will be the market rate of the trade nance credit lines available
to exporters (R e;t). In our base case, we assume that these US dollar interventions
are fully funded by previously accumulated foreign exchange reserves. The importance
of the source of funding will become clear below, as we relax this last assumption22.
Domestic Credit : The central bank o¤ers a xed amount of a one-period loan,
denominated in domestic currency. The interest rate is set in a competitive auction in
which all rms can bid. In this case, the interest rate will be the borrowing rate in the
domestic credit market (Rb;t).
In determining the importance of this second policy we convert the total central
bank-sponsored loans to the domestic market, Dg;t, into a reaction function to the







with  = 0:10. This number falls, based on microeconometric evidence for the Brazilian
economy, within the range of our best estimates for the impact of the domestic credit
policy on prevailing spreads23.
22In dening the size of these interventions, we focus on the Central Banks balance-sheet and, from
it, approximate the volume of trade credit extended, measured as a percentage of quarterly GDP.
Starting in the last quarter of 2008, the estimated quantities are: 3%, 2.5%, 2%, 1%, and 0.15% of
quarterly GDP.
23To calibrate for the e¤ect of domestic credit facilities on prevailing spreads, we start by looking at
evidence from microeconometric studies on the total e¤ect of central bank reserve requirements on the
average domestic spreads in Brazil. Costa (2004), in a comprehensive investigation of the Brazilian
banking sector, estimates that reserve requirements account for about 10.66% of average spreads.
Combining this with the 39% reduction compared to the pre-crisis rules  in reserve requirements
during the crisis, as shown by Mesquita and Torós (2010), we construct a range for the total impact
of the domestic credit policy on the prevailing, post-crisis, average domestic spreads implied by our
model (the model-based spreads with no credit policy can be found in gure 5a).
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1.4.1 Understanding the Mechanism
The main mechanisms in the model can be understood by looking at the export
and wholesale sectors during a crisis. This is done in gures 3a and 3b, where we plot
the dynamics of selected variables in our baseline scenario and with credit policies.
When faced with the higher cost of borrowing abroad (1st graph on the left in gure
3a), trading companies start to repay their foreign debt (3rd graph on the left of gure
3a) and switching to other sources of funding. Their alternative is to contract debt
with banks in the domestic market (2nd graph on the left of gure 3a). In terms of the
model, this means that the Euler equation (1.33) now holds as an equality.
The exporterstransition into domestic debt nancing propagates the shock to
other sectors in the economy through two channels. First, it puts pressure on both
lending (3rd graph on the left in gure 3b) and borrowing rates (1st graph on the right
in gure 3a). With higher rates, the demand for goods from borrowers investments by
the wholesale rms (2nd graph on the left of gure 3b) and lenders consumption by
the households (1st graph on the right of gure 3b) decreases. The second transmission
conduit comes from the balance of payments: the repayment of foreign debt stresses the
exchange rate (3rd graph on the right of gure 3a). Given the high share of imported
capital goods, that mainly causes a further decline in investments.
Firms in the wholesale sector are a¤ected by both channels, as gures 3a and
3b clearly demonstrate. The higher borrowing rate increases the required future return
on capital. More importantly, the fall in the demand for domestic goods, coming from
higher rates and the adjustment to the balance of payments, decreases the current
return on capital and, as a consequence, the net worth of wholesale rms. This last
e¤ect amplies the initial shock because the wholesale rms now need to borrow more
in the domestic market as well, further increasing the local rates and reducing domestic
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demand. It also disseminates the shock, as in the "nancial accelerator" literature,
because the net worth of these rms takes several periods to recover.
Overall, the initial declines in output, consumption and investment can be sig-
nicant. In the quarter of the impact, they fall, at annualized rates, in the range of
about 4% to 6%. Moreover, even though they start to recover in the next few quarters,
these variables remain below their steady-state levels for a signicant period. These
facts, together with the increase in net exports, are robust empirical e¤ects of shocks
to the external supply of credit that our model, as well as most previous models in the
literature, can replicate.
There is, however, something fundamentally di¤erent about our model: it ac-
counts for the domestic credit frictions that characterize most developing economies.
In gure 4, we highlight the importance of this through the behavior of a set of basic
economic variables under three separate situations: (i) our baseline case, already seen
in gures 3a and 3b, which assumes the highest level of spread-debt elasticity; (ii) a case
where there is no distortion in the domestic market, as described in Section 1.3.1; and
(iii) an inelastic spread-debt relation ( = 1), which represents an environment with
low distortion. A comparison between the domestic spreadsschedules for the base-
line scenario and the no-distortion setting shows that the borrowing rates can increase
signicantly with the nancial frictions (2nd graph on the right of gure 4).
Because of this feature, our setup, unlike most existing models, can ease the
e¤ects of the crisis on both the economys base interest rate and CPI ination, despite
the fact that it does not account for the full size of the Brazilian credit market24 or for
the demand reducing terms of trade of shock. In most emerging market economies, both
24The full size of the Brazilian credit market was 120% of the quarterly GDP in 2008. Our model,
which looks only at a specic part of the corporate sector debt accounts for a credit volume of 22% of
GDP.
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the policy rate (lending rate) and ination declined during the nancial crisis of 2008-
2009. In the traditional framework, without domestic credit frictions, this simply cannot
happen: the unique interest rate rises with the increase in the international spread. In
our model, the lending rate also increases when the nancial frictions are low (inelastic
spread-debt case). However, the higher the value of , the smaller is the increase. If the
domestic nancial system can only increase lending with sizeable increases in spreads, as
one might suspect to be true in the short run in emerging economies with less developed
nancial markets, the policy rate might actually decrease. Our baseline scenario does
not introduce enough distortions to generate this behavior for longer periods, but the
rate decrease in the rst period of the crisis and comparison across schedules clearly
demonstrates that it goes in the right (data dened) direction.
The intuition for the above result is simple. The policy rate reacts to ination
and output. The drop in GDP pushes the interest rate down. The exchange rate
depreciation, however, increases ination and, hence, requires a higher interest rate.
But larger spreads decrease the demand for goods from borrowers, reducing ination
and, as a consequence, lowering interest rates. If this last e¤ect is strong enough, the
policy rate will fall. In terms of ination, our model goes in the same direction, with
smaller increases for higher values of . It is important to note that the increase in net
exports follows immediately from the depreciation of the nominal (and real) exchange
rate in the model, whereas it has more of a J-curve behavior in the data. This is
to be expected, given that we are not controlling for the setup (adjustment) costs of
international trade and that we assume away the signicant terms of trade shock su¤ered
concomitantly by the Brazilian economy. The instantaneous jump in net exports and
the lack of deationary pressures, in the model, from a drop in commodity prices (a
demand shock for a commodity exporter) can partially account for this deviation of
ination from the data.
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Finally, with a more detailed description of how the initial credit shock propa-
gates into the economy, we can address the question of why targeting credit to exporter
or to the domestic credit market in general, as implemented by various central banks,
might be important or not. This is the main question of the paper, which will be ad-
dressed in the next section, and the framework of previous models in literature could
not deal with it.
1.4.2 Discussion of the Credit Policies
We now turn our attention to the main question of the paper and evaluate the
e¤ectiveness of credit policies in the context of sudden stops. The aim of these policies
is to alleviate conditions in credit markets: the credit facilities to exporters target the
market for foreign loans and the domestic credit auctions aim at the market for domestic
loans. A rst observation is that, as mentioned before, in both cases, the central bank
provides credit at the market rate. The only operating channel of any intervention is
its general equilibrium e¤ect on spreads as the volume of intermediation by the private
sector varies.
We also point out that abstract from direct costs associated with the credit
procedures of the central bank. An underlying assumption is that the central bank
doesnt need to impose these costs on the borrowers. To the extent that, as it will
become clear, some of our results are that certain policies would reduce welfare, the
presence of central bank costs should only strength those conclusions. The absence of
these costs are also less important for questions about the di¤erent benets of di¤erent
policies, another point that we emphasize in the discussion below.
A nal important consideration is that our analysis is restricted to the periods
during and after the crisis. For example, we ignore the e¤ects that the knowledge that a
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sudden stop can occur would have on the behavior of agents before it happens. This is
true, even though the implementation of some of the policies might depend on actions
(for example, the accumulation of foreign reserves by the central bank) taken prior to
the crisis. A complete assessment of the policies should consider these aspects. We
leave those issues for future research, but one should keep in mind this caveat while
reading the results below.
Credit to Exporters
Figure 5 presents the counterfactual implications of removing each of the two
policies, one at a time ("no domestic credit" and "no credit to exporters") and, then,
of eliminating all interventions in the credit markets ("no credit policy"). In the case
of credit to exporters, one can see that by providing an alternative source of funding,
the central bank allows exporters to repay a larger fraction of their foreign debt. In
equilibrium, this reduces the international spread. Since previously accumulated foreign
reserves are used to fund the central bank loans, the repayment of external debt does
not, however, put pressure on the exchange rate.
The wholesale rms also benet from the credit to exporters policy through two
channels. First, exporters contract less debt in the domestic market, and, as a result,
they do not generate as much strain on local spreads. Second, a lower international
spread reduces the costs of exports for any given level of exchange rate depreciation,
and, as a consequence, increases the overall demand for the home good. The prots
and the net worth of the wholesale rms also rise accordingly. This last e¤ect improves
their balance sheets and, hence, their capacity to invest. This further increases the
demand for home goods and helps reduce local spreads.
On the whole, the policy has signicant impacts. Aggregate variables such as
real GDP, consumption, and investment improve (gure 5b) by as much as 0.5% in
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the rst quarter of the shock when compared to the "no credit to exporters" case. In
terms of welfare, measured as the steady state consumption equivalent and presented
in Table 2, the policy reduces the negative impact of the crisis by 36% (from -0.0293%
to -0.0187%). It should not come as a surprise that providing credit to exporters is an
e¤ective countercyclical tool in the case of a sudden stop in the trade nance credit
lines. The initial shock is a negative shift in the supply of external credit to domestic
rms. By o¤ering its previously accumulated foreign exchange reserves, the central
bank is e¤ectively replacing part of the more expensive external credit lines.
To assess the key role played by foreign reserves, Figure 6 shows what would have
happened had the central bank provided credit to exporters by issuing domestic bonds
to households, instead of using foreign reserves to fully fund its operation. Exporters
would still have repaid a signicant fraction of their foreign debt, but, without being
compensated by a reduction in the central bank holdings of foreign reserves, this move-
ment would have resulted in a net negative outow of capital. As a consequence, both
the real interest and the exchange rate depreciation would have risen further to decrease
the domestic absorption (consumption and investment). In addition, the exchange rate
depreciation would have caused higher ination. Under the baseline calibration, these
combined e¤ects reduce welfare (Table 2), when compared with the case with no policy
intervention. Note that with exible prices, the policy would improve welfare. However,
given that in most emerging economies ination stabilization is the most important ob-
jective of the central bank (in fact, as noted in the introduction, many countries adopt
an "ination targeting" regime), we consider the baseline calibration to be the more
relevant case.
To show how crucial is the correct assessment of the behavior of domestic credit
spread is for the design of credit policies, we consider the case where there are no
domestic frictions, as dened in section 1.3.1, and the case in which the domestic
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spread is debt inelastic ( = 1). The most interesting conclusion from this exercise is
that in both cases only the use of foreign exchange reserves matters. The intuition is
straightforward: in the absence of domestic frictions, it doesnt matter where in the
economy the central bank injects resources, as funds will always end up where they are
most needed.
We highlight this point by comparing two policies: (i) credit to exporters funded
with foreign reserves ("credit to exporters"), as in the baseline scenario, and (ii) selling
foreign reserves in the spot market and transferring the proceeds to the households
as a tax rebate ("tax rebate")25. To make the analysis more straightforward, we also
include the case without any credit policy. As can be seen in Figures 7a and 7b,
the only di¤erence between the policies is that, with a "tax rebate", the nancial
liabilities the trading companies sustain against the domestic private sector are higher
in comparison to the case where the central bank provides credit to exporters. However,
this di¤erence is irrelevant in the absence of domestic frictions or in the debt inelastic
case. In both situations, the spreads remain constant (at zero in the case of the former).
As a consequence, the equilibrium paths of all the relevant variables foreign borrowing,
international spreads, GDP, exchange rate, as well as all other variables in the model 
are the same for both policies.
Finally, these results also indicate a specic reason for central banks to accumu-
late foreign reserves in "normal" times (i.e., prior to the crisis): to be able to lend to
exporters during the crisis. Note also that the social benet of reserves accumulation
would be higher than the private one because by providing credit directly to exporters
during the crisis, the central bank can avoid the ine¢ ciencies in the domestic nancial
intermediation. This result goes along the lines of the precautionary argument for for-
25If, instead of a tax rebate, we consider a reduction in the government domestic debt, the results
are the same.
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eign reserves accumulation (see, for example, Jeanne and Ranciere (2006), Aizenman
and Lee (2007) and Jeanne (2007)).
Domestic Credit
The goal of the intervention in the domestic market ("domestic credit") is to
improve the allocation of funds between domestic savers and borrowers. In our econ-
omy, the domestic spread is the result of the private nancial systems ine¢ ciencies in
coordinating this allocation. In that sense, comparing, for example, the plotted lines
for "no domestic credit" and for the "baseline" scenario in Figure 4a, we can see that
the policy achieves its objective. However, we nd no impact at all in the volume
and spread of foreign debt, and only modest implications for GDP, consumption and
investment.
Moreover, our results indicate that providing domestic credit might reduce wel-
fare. The rst reason for this is that the policy can conict with other objectives of
the central bank. More specically, by improving the local nancial intermediation, the
central induces a higher level of domestic borrowing, which facilitates the repayment
of the foreign debt. As a consequence, net capital outow increases, putting pressure
on the exchange rate and, due to the pass-through e¤ects of currency depreciation,
raises ination. In the baseline calibration, the nominal frictions imply that this chain
of events reduces welfare from -0.01767%, with no domestic credit, to -0.01867% with
both policies (Table 2).
The impact is smaller if we assume exible prices, but the policy still reduces
welfare because exchange rate movements can have e¤ects beyond their impact on
ination. For example, as discussed above, capital goods contain a larger share of
imports and, hence, their real price index is more a¤ected by currency depreciations.
The last column in Table 2 shows that if the consumption and capital composites
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contained the same weight of imports, domestic credit would improve welfare.
Finally, it is important to point out that all these welfare results are similar when
we consider a larger volume of intervention in the domestic credit market, as can be
seen in the last row of Table 2.
Two Broader Lessons for Credit Policies in Emerging Markets
Domestic frictions matter for the design of credit policies.
This statement comes as no surprise: credit policies play a role because of nan-
cial frictions in the private sector. The interesting aspect is that, in emerging markets,
the policies were implemented in response to a shock in the foreign supply of credit,
where international nancial frictions faced by the economy are usually viewed as being
the central ones. These international imperfections are the focus of a vast literature on
the importance of nancial frictions in emerging market economies. In fact, in most
cases, the domestic market is assumed to be perfect (or irrelevant) and, hence, can be
completely ignored. That approach is justied when the focus is not on credit policy,
for economies with insignicant domestic nancial markets.
But, as we showed above, ignoring the empirically observed domestic frictions
can be misleading when considering credit policies. In particular, one could erroneously
conclude that there is no need for credit policy at all as the central bank could achieve
the same results by simply selling foreign exchange reserves in the spot market and
transferring the proceeds of the auction to the households. Given how cautious some
countries are in their use of international reserves (Aizenman and Sun 2009), it is clear
that considerations of the type we study here are signicant to the problem.
We are not, of course, the rst to note that domestic nancial frictions matter
to understand policies in the presence of sudden stops. Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001) point out that a nancial crisis in emerging economies can be originally caused
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by a shock to the quality of their international collateral. But it is the scarcity of
domestic collateral that justies the precautionary accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves by the central bank, as well as its use during a crisis. More closely related to
our conclusions, Calvo (2006) suggests that for the success of this surgical operation
[central bank directly channel international reserves to sectors which, on net, display a
positive marginal social return to the use of international reserves], it is necessary for
the central bank to be well on top of developments in domestic credit markets.
The mere fact of an increase in credit frictions does not necessarily imply that
central bank credit policy will raise welfare
We saw two examples where credit policies (credit to exporters partially funded
with reserves, and domestic credit) facilitated the allocation of funds between domestic
borrowers and savers, but did not improve welfare  they actually did the opposite.
This happened because the policies increased each in their own way the pressure on
the balance of payments, as exporters could more easily borrow in the domestic market
to repay their foreign debt. If foreign exchange reserves are not used to counterbalance
the strain on currency markets, the resulting exchange rate depreciation and higher
ination decrease welfare.
Similar e¤ects have been previously emphasized in the literature. For example,
Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010) consider a model in which the provision of
domestic liquidity by the monetary authority to support the domestic nancial system
during a bank run "...magnies the potential claims on o¢ cial foreign exchange reserves,
and hence magnies the currency depreciation...". In their model, this observation
justies the hoarding of large sums of foreign exchange reserves by emerging economies.
This point is worth emphasizing because policies designed to act exclusively upon
the ine¢ ciencies of the domestic nancial markets are exactly the ones recommended
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in most works for closed economies or at least for developed economies. In particu-
lar, this is the case of the recent literature addressing the responses of the US Federal
Reserve during the great recession of 2008-09. For instance, Geanakoplos (2010) ar-
gues that, in a model of margins requirement and collateralized debt, "[t]he Fed must
step around the banks and lend directly to investors, at more generous collateral lev-
els than the private markets are willing to provide". Gertler and Karadi (2011) use
their "model to evaluate the e¤ect of expanding central bank credit intermediation to
combat a simulated nancial crisis ", and conclude "that the welfare benets may be
substantial if the e¢ ciency costs of government intervention are modest". Cúrdia and
Woodford (2010a) also describe assumptions under which a disturbance that increases
credit spreads would justify central bank lending to private non-nancial borrowers.
What our results show is that those policy recommendations depend on the
nancial structure that is assumed. For many emerging markets, given the structure
of their economies and how the crisis reached them, the most e¤ective credit policies
are of a di¤erent type. They must be funded out of previously accumulated foreign
exchange reserves and are most appropriately targeted to the export sector.
1.5 Conclusion
Crises have long been fertile ground for economic theory. The last global in-
stallment, over 2007-2009, was certainly no exception. Macroeconomics, in particular,
beneted not only from the emergence of a new set of questions searching for answers,
but also from the resurgence a whole repository of controversies that many believed to
have been pacied: what should the instruments of monetary policy be?, do credit
policies have a role to play in the management of economic crises?, do we really un-
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derstand all the functions of foreign-exchange reservesaccumulation?, what nancial
frictions should be taken into account when dealing with sudden stops?. These are
but a few topics that have either resurfaced or gained centrality in academic research
agendas as a direct consequence of the latest crisis.
Our paper belongs to this broader agenda. More specically, we have tried to
answer the following important question: were the credit policies implemented, during
the recent crisis, by several developing economies useful in dealing with the economic
e¤ects of the sudden stop in international credit ows?
To answer this question, weve built a quantitative small open model with two im-
perfect credit markets, one domestic and the other international. This innovation deliv-
ers a nancial market entrance di¤erentiation that exists in many developing economies:
while domestic credit markets are open to most rms, only some specic companies
(trading companies or exporters) have access to foreign borrowing. It also allows shocks
to the foreign supply of credit to a¤ect domestic spreads through a simple mechanism:
rms that previously borrowed abroad turn to the local credit market for funding to a
great extent and, hence, increase the cost of domestic loanable funds. This works as
a clear, but seldom highlighted, transmission mechanism for the external crisis, as the
jump in spreads in both markets raises nancing costs for all borrowers in the economy
and depresses output.
Our main ndings suggest, rst, that it can make sense for the central bank
to provide credit directly to exporters, (even) at the prevailing market price. Not
only does this restrain spreads, increasing GDP, but it also generates an unambiguous
welfare improvement, as long as the intervention is funded out of previously accumulated
foreign-exchange reserves. After all, by providing a cheaper alternative of foreign credit
to exporters during the crisis, the credit facility generates positive general equilibrium
e¤ects on spreads as exporters reduce the amount of debt contracted with the private
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sector, without having a government in search of new funding to ll that gap.
Without the use of reserves to fund the operation, however, credit facilities to
exporters would have reduced welfare in our model, as the incentive to repay their
foreign debt would pressure the exchange rate, without providing much relief for do-
mestic spreads. Ination would, consequently, creep up to undesirable levels. This
result shines a new light in the large literature on the accumulation and management of
foreign-exchange reserves, as it is the rst to demonstrate, in a quantitative macroeco-
nomic model, that using foreign reserves to provide credit to exporters during a sudden
stop can improve welfare.
Our second nding deals with policies aimed more generally at the domestic mar-
ket, and it suggests that, even though they are e¤ective in reducing domestic spreads,
their upshot on welfare will be negative. Much like in the case without the use of
reserves, the incentives towards repaying foreign debt are distorted and the resulting
capital outow weights on the exchange rate and, consequently, on ination. As was
pointed out before, however, this result should be viewed with caution. There are
many potentially good reasons to intervene in the domestic credit markets, such as
avoiding possible bank runs. These have been thoroughly studied in the literature and
are not the subject of our investigation here. With this caveat in mind, nevertheless,
one can clearly understand the importance of this negative result, as some developing
economies engaged in domestic credit market interventions with the unmistakable (and
apparently wrong-headed) objective of reducing spreads to all rms.
Finally, we highlight the importance of accounting for domestic nancial frictions
by showing that, in their absence, the central bank has no reason to engage in any kind
of credit policy. Comparing a policy of direct credit to exporters, funded with foreign-
exchange reserves, with a policy of selling foreign reserves in the spot market and
rebating the proceeds to the households, we nd that both approaches are equivalent in
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an economy with perfect domestic nancial markets. Without frictions or if domestic
spreads are positive but remain constant during the crisis, it does not matter where in
the economy the central bank injects resources, because they will always end-up where
they are most needed.
Overall, our ndings suggest that intervening only in domestic credit markets,
or engaging in more general credit policies without the necessary backing of foreign-
exchange reserves, is not a good recipe for dealing with sudden stops in capital ows.
Credit focused at the more a¤ected sectors in a developing economy mainly the export-
import rms, which use more borrowing to fund their operations can be quite helpful
during a crisis, as long as the central bank funds its actions with reserves hoarded before
the crisis. In designing these policies, however, one needs to account for the fundamental
aspects in the economy, like the observed, crisis-induced increase in domestic spreads.
Major revisions in the pre-established consensus are, obviously, important. Credit
interventions seem to have been an e¤ective countercyclical, welfare-improving policy
during the nancial crisis of 2008-09, in emerging economies. However, this general
statement does not apply to all cases, and some misguided interventions can clearly
reduce welfare. The one fundamental lesson that comes out of our analysis is that the
desirability or not of engaging in credit policies depends crucially on their implemen-
tation. A deep understanding of the economys fundamental characteristics should,
therefore, be an absolute requirement before considering any deviation from the usual,
time-established economic policies.
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1.6 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Parameters in the Model
The table describes all the parameters in the model and their baseline calibration
Parameter Value Description
Conventional parameters calibrated from the literature in emerging market economies
s 1 inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
y 2 inverse of the labor supply elasticity
n* 1 exports price elasticity
h 8 elasticity of substitution across the different varieties of home goods
ap 2/3 probability of a retail firm not being able to adjust its price
rk 0.25 elasticity of substitution in the production of capital goods
fp 2 response of the policy rate to inflation
fy 0.75 response of the policy rate to output
Parameters calibrated to match moments of the Brazilian data in the steady state
a 0.80 share of labor (set to match the GDP share of investment expenditures: 0.20)
d 0.967 home good bias (share of imported consumption goods: 0.02)
δk 0.50 home good bias in capital goods (share of imported capital and input: 0.10)
X - domestic credit supply curve (domestic spread at 2.4% in annual terms)
ye - foreign credit supply curve (international spread at 1.6% in annual terms)
kw 0.0047 start-up in the wholesale sector (net worth –assets ratio at sector at 0.5)
ke 0.00034 start-up in the export sector (net worth –assets ratio at sector at 0.03)
Less Conventional Parameters
x 22 domestic spread volume elasticity
he 1 international spread leverage elasticity
qw 0.975 fraction of wholesaler staying in their group (average firm life: 10 years)
qe 0.975 fraction of exporters who stay in their group (average firm life: 10 years)
Other parameters
L 1.552 disutility of working  (normalizes the steady-state output to 1)
C* 0.12 foreign demand (normalizes the steady-state terms of trade to 1)
b 0.99 time discounting (steady-state policy rate to 4% annual terms)
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The gure shows the performance of selected variables from 2007 to 2010. The
vertical line mark the jump in the international spread faced by Brazilians rms that
occurred when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt.




























Figure 1.1: Figure 1a - The Financial Crisis of 2008-09 in Brazil
*Quarterly data, log scale and detrended. ** Quarterly data.
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The gure shows the performance of selected variables from 2007 to 2010. The
two vertical lines mark two jumps in the international spread faced by Brazilians rms.
The second and larger one, occurred when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt
































Figure 1.2: Figure 1b - The Financial Crisis of 2008-09 in Brazil (continued)
* Monthly average. Trade nance credit lines available to exporters. Spread over libor. **
Monthly average. Average of short term working capital credit lines compute by the BCB. Spread is
over banks fundings costs. *** Monthly average. Policy rate controled by the BCB (minus the Fed
Fund Rate). **** CPI ination, year over year
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The graph shows the spreads on trade nance (short term and denominated US$)
and domestic (short term and denominated in domestic currency) credit lines for top
rating rms in Brazil. The data was provided by Brazilian banks.
Figure 1.3: Figure 2 - Trade Finance and Domestic Working Capital Lines
Annualized spread.
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The gure reports the dynamics of selected variables under the baseline calibra-









































Figure 1.4: Figure 3a - Crisis Experiment - Baseline Calibration
All variables are deviations from the steady state. *Annualized(pp). ** Log deviation (%)
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Figure 1.5: Figure 3b - Crisis Experiment - Baseline Calibration (continued)
All variables are deviations from the steady state. * Log deviation (%). ** Share of GDP (pp).
***Annualized (pp).
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"Baseline" includes the frictions, in the "no domestic friction" case the domestic
market is complete and in the "debt inelastic spread" the domestic spread is inelastic













































baseline no domestic  fric tion debt inelastic  spread
Figure 1.6: Figure 4 - Crisis Experiment without Frictions in the Domestic Financial
Market
All variables are deviations from the steady state. * Log deviation (%). ** Annualized (pp).
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The gure reports the dynamics of selected variables under the baseline calibra-






































baseline no domestic  credit no credit to exporters no credit pol icy
Figure 1.7: Figure 5a - Counterfactual Analysis
All variables are deviations from the steady state. * Annualized (pp). ** Log deviation (%).
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baseline no domestic credit no credit to exporters no credit policy
Figure 1.8: Figure 5b - Counterfactual Analysis (continued)
All variables are deviations from the steady state. * Annualized (pp). ** Log deviation (%).
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In the "fully funded" case foreign reserves cover 100% of the amount of credit










































fully funded with reserves partially funded with reserves
Figure 1.9: Figure 6 -Credit to Exporters and the Role of Foreign Reserves
All variables are deviations from the steady state. * Annualized (pp). ** Log deviation (%).
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Three assumptions with respect to the use of foreign reserves: no change ("no
policy"), lend foreign reserves to exporters ("credit to exporters"), sell reserves in the







































no policy credit to exporters tax rebate
Figure 1.10: Figure 7a - Policies without Domestic Frictions
All variables are deviations from the steady state. * Annualized (pp). ** Log deviation (%).
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Three assumptions with respect to the use of foreign reserves: no change ("no
policy"), lend foreign reserves to exporters ("credit to exporters"), sell reserves in the








































no policy credit to exporters tax rebate
Figure 1.11: Figure 7b - Policies with Debt Inelastic Domestic Spread
All variables are deviations from the steady state. * Annualized (pp). ** Log deviation (%).
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Table 1.2: Welfare Loss
Consumption equivalent (pp). *Foreign reserves cover at most 80% of the credit to
exporters. ** = 5 (see equation 1.53)
Baseline Flexible Flexible Prices &
Calibration Prices Same Price Index
Both Credit Policies -0.01867 -0.01318 -0.01622
No Domestic Credit -0.01767 -0.01310 -0.01625
No Credit to Exporter -0.02927 -0.02233 -0.02491
No Credit Policy -0.02695 -0.02226 -0.02494









Intermediation Channel of External
Shocks and Credit Policies in
Emerging Market Economies
2.1 Introduction
In1 the nancial crisis of 2008 and 2009, as world output collapsed and interna-
tional credit markets became dysfunctional, most emerging markets economies faced a
large decline in their terms of trade (in particular commodity exporter countries), an
increase in the interest rate they could borrow from abroad and a reduction in capital
inows (see Blanchard, Faruqee, and Das 2010). These shocks were no novelties for
1I would like to thank Michael Woodford, Ricardo Reis and seminar participants in the Macroeco-
nomics Colloquium at Columbia University for their comments
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developing economies. In fact, the business cycle literature has highlighted the impor-
tance of terms of trade and international borrowing rates to developing economies (e.g,
Mendoza 1995, Kose 2002, Broda 2004, Neumeyer and Perri 2005, and García-Cicco,
Pancrazi, and Uribe 2010). And a large literature has studied episodes of strong re-
versals in nancial ows (e.g, Calvo 1998, Cook 2004, Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco
2004, Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi 2006, Devereux, Lane, and Xu 2006, Cúrdia 2008,
Braggion, Christiano, and Roldos 2009 and Mendoza 2010).
However, there were some important new developments in terms of policy reac-
tion as policymarkers in several emerging markets adopted, in most cases for the rst
time, a variety of specially targeted credit interventions (Ishi, Stone, and Yehoue 2009).
Examples include direct acquisition of private sector securities in Korea; provision of
liquidity against trade nance securities collateral in Brazil; transfer of funds from the
treasury to government-owned banks so that they could increase their loan portfolios
in Brazil; broadening of the list of eligible collateral for monetary operations to include
commercial papers in Chile; and government guarantee programs for commercial paper
in Mexico.
Central banks in developed countries also intervened in credit markets. For exam-
ple, the US Fed directly injected credit into private markets (see Cúrdia and Woodford
2010a and Gertler and Karadi 2011). A common ground behind the interventions in
both developing and developed economies seems to be failures in the banking system
or more generally in nancial intermediation. As Gertler and Karadi (2011) states we
interpret unconventional monetary policy as expanding central bank credit intermedi-
ation to o¤set a disruption of private nancial intermediation.
Therefore the rst goal of this paper is to develop a quantitative small open
economy DSGE model (SOEM) with domestic nancial intermediation. I can then
calibrate the model to emerging economies data and use it to quantity how the external
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shocks mentioned above interact with the domestic nancial sector. The nal objective
is then to evaluate the impact of the implemented credit policies in mitigating the initial
shocks.
Note that the emphasis here is on the domestic part. Several SOEM incorpo-
rate nancial frictions on the relation between domestic agents (households, rms or
government) and foreign investors, while at the same time assume no frictions in the
relation between domestic lenders and borrowers2. But the credit policies we study aim
to improve the intermediation among domestic lenders and borrowers.
Our domestic nancial sector is an adaptation of the one in the closed economy
model of Gertler and Karadi (2011). Local intermediaries take interest-rate bearing
deposits from domestic and foreign savers to provide funds to rms, which use the
resources to nance their investment and working capital needs. Because of a moral
hazard with a costly enforcement problem, the leverage of banks depends on the spread
between the expected return on its assets and the interest rate paid on deposits. Since
the central bank doesnt face the same constraint, it might be able to improve the
e¢ ciency of the nancial intermediation in periods of nancial stress.
Even though the policies were a response to domestic frictions, the original shocks
faced by emerging economies during the crisis 2008-2009 were, as mentioned above,
international ones. Therefore our second goal is to identify and quantify the main
channels linking terms of trade and international nancial conditions to the domestic
banking system3.
2See, for example, Cook (2004), Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004), Neumeyer and Perri (2005),
Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2006), Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006), Cúrdia (2008), Braggion,
Christiano, and Roldos (2009), Mendoza (2010) and García-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010) . Two
exceptions are Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) and Martins and Salles (2011). However, the
former has frictions a la Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) but no nancial intermediation, while
the latter doesnt focus on the balance sheet of nancial intermediaries as we do here.
3Banks account for most of the nancial intermediation in developing economies. Therefore we use
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We consider four main channels linking these shocks to the nancial sector. First,
terms of trade a¤ect the protability of the corporate sector and hence banks return on
assets. Second, an increase in the international interest rate depresses asset prices and
reduces the prot of banks. Third, international rates also a¤ects banks borrowing cost.
And for last, exchange rate depreciations associated with both types shocks weakens
the balance sheet position of banks. This e¤ect arises from the well documented fact
that most of the foreign debt in emerging economies is denominated in foreign currency.
Here we assume that banks are the domestic agent borrowing from abroad. Therefore,
the negative balance sheet e¤ects occurs in the nancial sector. Once the banking sector
is hit by the shocks, it propagates and amplies the initial e¤ects.
The quantitative importance of these channels and the amplication caused by
the domestic nancial sector depends on the economy under consideration. In our case,
we calibrate the model with data from Brazil, which has a medium size export sector
(exports represent roughly 12% of GDP in our sample) and holds modest levels of
foreign debt (18% of annual GDP). In this case, the domestic nancial sector has the
largest amplication e¤ect in response to an increase in the international interest rate
and the corresponding decline in assets price is the main channel. Within our baseline
calibration, the fall in output is twice as large in the model with domestic nancial
frictions when compared to a model without domestic banks. But we also show that if
the economy is more indebted in the international markets or has a larger export sector,
the domestic nancial sector can also cause a signicant amplication in response to a
terms of trade shock.
To quantify the importance of the intervention in credit markets we assume
that central bank acquires the securities issued by the wholesale rms at the prevailing
terms like nancial intermediaries and banks interchangeably.
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market prices. Hence the only operating channel of any intervention is its general
equilibrium e¤ect on spreads as the volume of intermediation by the private sector
varies. The reduction in spreads is possible because the central bank is not subject to
the same information and enforcement frictions a¤ecting banks. There might be other
costs associated with the credit procedures of the central bank. For example, central
banks are most likely less e¢ cient than the private sector in allocating credit because of
a lack of expertise and/or political reasons. The underlying assumptions here are then
that these costs are high enough to discourage interventions outside crises episodes and
that the central bank doesnt need to impose these costs on the borrowers. A welfare
analysis needs to take those into considerations. However, at this point, we focus on
the positive approach of describing the dynamics under alternative policies and abstract
from a normative discussion based on welfare evaluation.
Our simulations show that the intervention can reduce by almost 30% the initial
GDP fall in response to a large increase in international rates. By reducing domestic
spreads, the policy increases asset prices, improve the net worth of banks, the volume
of the credit and, as consequence, minimizes the impact of the shock. In the case of a
negative shock to exports, the benets of the policies are smaller. This is the other side
of the small amplication role played by the domestic nancial markets in response to
this type of shock, under the baseline calibration considered here.
Credit interventions are most powerful against shocks that have large impact on
banks balance sheets. A purely nancial shock that directly a¤ects the net worth of
banks is another case in which credit interventions is e¤ective. An example of this type
of shock occurs when banks su¤er heavy loss in some of its assets. In an international
context, this loss could come from assets held abroad and uncorrelated with the do-
mestic economy. During the nancial crisis of 2008-09, this was an important channel
propagating the US subprime mortgage crisis to Europe, as European banks su¤ered
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large losses from their holdings in the US. The model presented here is suitable to study
these transmissions mechanisms.
To further illustrate these results we perform a brief case study of Brazil in the
nancial crisis of 2008-09. The country faced an increase of 6% in the international
spreads and a decline of 40% in the foreign currency value of exports. As a result,
output, at its troughs, was -6.86% below the previous trend. Among other policies, the
government transferred funds to the government-owned development bank, BNDES, so
that it could increase its loans to companies. In 2009, the transfers totalled 3% of the
GDP or close to 7% of the total volume of credit in the economy at the time. When
we use our model to study the impact of this policy, our conclusions are mixed. We
estimate that, in the rst quarter of the crisis, the policy improved output (the main
policy goal) by 23%, but in the second quarter, at the trough of the recession, the
improvement was of only 8.7%. From then onward the impact is negligible. Initially,
the interest rate was the main shock hitting the economy. But from the beginning of
2009 the decline in exports was the most important factor behind the recession. The
comments above indicate that, at least in the case of Brazil, the domestic nancial
sector is less important in propagating this type of shock. As a consequence, the credit
policy was less benecial.
Finally, we point out that the model presented here is general and can be used
to address other questions. We illustrate that by showing that it can replicate standard
business cycle properties of emerging market economies with just three types of shocks:
the terms of trade, the international interest rate and a domestic stationary technology
shock. The model is also appropriate to discuss conventional monetary policy (interest
rate setting) in the context, for example, of a strong reversal in external capital inows
(i.e. a sudden stops episodes) because it explicitly includes a domestic banking system,
which is often at the epicenter of these episodes (see, for example, Kaminsky and
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Reinhart 1999). Even though banks are crucial to explain the severity of sudden stops,
so far, the literature has dealt with this issue only indirectly by incorporating nancial
frictions at the rm level. According to our experiments, the baseline Taylor rule
dominates other policies in terms of GDP performance. For last, even though we
calibrate the model with emerging markets economies, the structure of the model applies
to any small open economy where the domestic nancial sector is also important.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In section 2, we present the model
in detail. Section 3 explores the role of the domestic nancial sector. Section 4 contains
the analysis of the unconventional polices, while the more conventional, interest-rate-
setting policies are the topic of section 5. Section 6 is devoted to a brief case study of
Brazil. We conclude in section 7.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Outline of the Model
The model is a small open economy version of Gertler and Karadi (2011). The
main feature is the presence of nancial intermediaries that take interest-rate bearing
deposits from domestic households and international lenders to provide capital to do-
mestic rms. They also engage in maturity transformation as they fund themselves
with one-period deposits but hold, among other assets, innite lived securities (equity).
Moreover, because of a moral hazard with costly enforcement problem, the leverage of
banks depends on the spread between the expected return on its assets and the interest
rate paid on deposits.
The remaining parts of the model are fairly standard. There are two tradeable
goods, a domestic and foreign one, and four agents in the economy: Households choose
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consumption, supply , and hold domestic bonds; wholesale rms hire capital and labor
to produce the domestic good; a continuum of retailers di¤erentiate the home good at
not cost and face price stickiness à la Calvo; and capital producing companies produce
new capital goods and refurbish depreciated units. The wholesale rms require capital
to fund their intraperiod working capital and the investment in physical capital.
We close the model with a government entity that combines the roles of both
treasury and central bank, and the usual resource constraint on home goods. The
balance of payments, as always, reects the budget constraints of all the actors. The
details of the economy are spelled-out below.
Households
The households are composed of a constant fraction (1   f) of workers and a
fraction f of bankers. A worker provides labor to the wholesale rms and returns her
wage to the household, while a banker manages one bank and also returns her earnings
i.e, the prot of the bank she manages to the family unit. Individuals move between
the worker and banker groups. In particular, every period, a random fraction (1  ) of
bankers become workers. To keep the fractions of each type constant, the same number
of individuals, also randomly selected, become bankers. Note that, even though bankers
are responsible for the operation of the banks, the household is the actual owner.
Within the household there is perfect insurance and, hence, all consumption
decisions are taken at the household level. However, all the professional transactions
between bankers and other agents in the economy, including those within the same
household, are done at arms-length. In the case of the nancial decisions of a bank, the
banker is considered an insider, while the household is an outside investor.
When an individual becomes a banker, she receives a start-up equity to initialize
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operations. The size of the initial net worth and the fact that a banker has a nite
expected life implies that the banks always borrow to nance their investments. All
of the relevant decisions relating the banks, such as the nancing decision, the initial
equity, the evolution of its net worth, and the aggregate per period net cash ow
payments to the households, shall become clear when we discuss their problem in the
next subsection. At this juncture, it su¢ ces to say that a banker, when exiting the
group, returns all remaining net worth to the households.
There are two types of consumption goods in the economy: home goods (CH;t)











These preferences imply that the aggregate price index Pt, and the demands for










CF;t = (1  )PtCt
St
(2.4)
where St is the nominal exchange rate, dened as the domestic price of the foreign
currency, PH;t is the aggregate domestic price of the home good, and we normalize the
foreign price level to 1.
Households can trade real government bonds and make deposits with a domestic
nancial intermediary. These two nancial assets are both risk free and perfect sub-
stitutes. We aggregate them into a single variable Bt. The consumption (Ct), bond
holdings and labor (Lt) decisions are given by maximizing the discounted expected
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with respect to fCt; Lt; Btg, subject to the budget constraint
PtCt + PtBt  WtLt + PtRt 1Bt 1 +f;t   Tt (2.6)
whereWt is the wage, Rt is the real interest rate received from holding one period bonds,
f;t is the aggregate net cash ow from all the nancial and non-nancial rms owned by
the household and Tt is a lump sum tax. Following a common practice in the emerging
market literature, utility is dened as in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu¤man (1988).
This assumption eliminates the wealth e¤ect on labor supply by making the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and labor independent of consumption.
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(2.9)
is the marginal utility of consumption.
Domestic Financial Intermediation
A continuum of identical banks, indexed by j, raise one-period, interest-rate-
bearing deposits (i.e. short term debt contracts) from domestic households and/or
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international investors to fund the wholesale rms. The nancial intermediaries are
owned by the households and operated by the bankers within them. A specic bank
has two sources of funds: the internal accumulation of prots and the debt contracts
issued to households and foreign investors.
Let Nt(j) be a given net worth level of a bank j at period t. The balance sheet
constraint imposes that
SK;t(j) = Nt(j) +Dt(j) (2.10)
where SK;t(j) is the value of the securities issued by wholesale rms acquired by bank
j and Dt(j) is the total amount of debt issued by bank j.
The next period net worth of a currently existing bank is given by
Nt+1(j) = (RS;t+1  RD;t+1)SK;t(j) +RD;t+1Nt(j) (2.11)
where RS;t+1 is the real rate of return on assets and RD;t+1 is the average real rate paid
on deposits.
As long as Et (RS;t+1  RD;t+1) is positive, the banker will keep accumulating
assets and will return the prots to the household only when she exits the sector. As









or, using equation (2.11),















with xt+1 = SK;t+1(j)=SK;t(j) and zt+1 = Nt+1(j)=Nt(j). Note that constant returns to
scale imply that the growth rate of assets and net worth are independent of the size of
the bank (i.e, independent of j).
A moral hazard problem with costly enforcement imposes a participation con-
straint on the banker. Each period the banker can divert a fraction  of its assets. If
this happens, the depositors can immediately force the intermediary into bankruptcy.
However, because it is too costly, depositors can recover only a fraction (1  ) of the
assets. To ensure that the banker doesnt deviate funds from the bank the following
incentive constraint must hold
Vt(j) = tSK;t(j) + tNt(j)  SK;t(j) (2.16)
The problem of a banker is to maximize (2.13) subject to (2.16). With Et
(RS;t+1   RD;t+1) > 0, t is positive and the banker wants to accumulated assets. If
  t there is no restriction on leverage and the banker keeps accumulating assets. This
accumulation will eventually drive the spread RS;t+1 RD;t+1 and t to zero. Therefore,
for a positive  this is not a general equilibrium. If  > t, the participation constraint
binds and imposes a limit on leverage. In that case
SK;t(j) =
t
  tNt(j) = tNt(j) (2.17)
where t  t= (  t) measures the bank leverage.
Equation (2.17) determines the size of the assets of a bank as a function of its
net worth. This relation is the same for all banks so we can drop the j index. Note
also that t is increasing in Et (RS;t+1  RD;t+1) and, as a consequence, t is positive
related to the spread in the nancial sector.
Banks can borrow by issuing debt contracts to the domestic households and to
foreign investors. In equilibrium, the cost of the former is the real interest rate paid by
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government bonds because households are indi¤erent between these bonds and bank
deposits. The foreign debt is denominated in foreign currency, as is the typical case
in emerging markets economies, and its gross interest rate (	t ) is taken as given by
bankers. The next subsection discusses the factors that determine the cost of foreign
debt.
As long as their expected costs are equal, banks are indi¤erent between domestic















Note that equation (2.18) is the uncovered interest rate parity in the model.
Furthermore, we impose a symmetric equilibrium where the liabilities of all banks have
the same composition between domestic and foreign debt. The average real rate each











where t is the ratio between foreign and total debt in the banking sector and st is the
real (in terms of the consumption composite good) exchange rate.
Aggregating the net worth of existing banks (equation 2.11) and adding the start-






Nt 1 + SK;t (2.20)
where  is the fraction of total assets distributed as start up capital.














International lenders to domestic agents face the risk of not being repaid and
hence require a premium to make loans. Following Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and
García-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010), the international rate can be broken into







The rate Rt is required by global investors to invest in risky assets in general, or
at least, in those related to emerging market economies. This rate depends on factors
that are orthogonal to local conditions. The empirical evidence suggests that these
global factors explain a large fraction of the variation in the international interest rate
faced by borrowers in emerging economies (see, for instance, Uribe and Yue 2006 and
Longsta¤, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton 2011)
Three examples of factors that can increase Rt are a rise in global risky aversion,
a tightening on the portfolio or capital constraints of agents that are the natural buyers
of risky assets and an increase in the perceived uncertainty associated with investing in
emerging markets.
In the rst example, an increase in global risk aversion, which can be caused by
a worldwide recession, is associated with "ight to quality" episodes. This was a key
factor during the Great Recession of 2007-09 and according to Blanchard, Faruqee, and
Das (2010) an important channel through which the crisis was propagated to emerging
economies.
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For the case of capital constraints, the second example above, Garleanu and
Pedersen (2011) shows that when leverage risk tolerant agents4 face tighter liquidity
constraints, the required rate of return on all risky assets increases. If these agents are
also the lenders to emerging economies, the rate Rt is also a¤ected. Along a similar
line of argument, Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) show that if emerging market assets
are not mature enough to be attractive to the general public, then their marginal buyer
are liquidity constrained investors who also hold other risky assets. As a consequence,
a fall in the price of some risky assets in a large developed economy increase the yields
on emerging market bonds partially because of a portfolio e¤ect: investor will want to
sell the latter securities to buy the former5. In the sudden stop literature, margin re-
quirements and portfolio considerations, combined with imperfect information aspects,
have also been used to explain contagion from a crisis in particular country to others
(see, for example, Calvo 1999 and Calvo and Mendoza 2000).
The last explanation for the global component of country spreads involves in-
vestorsKnightian uncertainty. If a nancial asset is relative new, as might been the
case of emerging market assets for international investors due to a lack of knowledge
about their underlying economies, they might be subject to this type of uncertainty.
Krishnamurthy (2010) provides a good description of how this e¤ect might take place:
"...crisis occurs when the new nancial assets behave in unexpected ways. Lacking a
historical record to refer to, market participants are faced with risks they dont under-
stand, and treat these risks as Knightian (Frank H. Knight 1921). Investorsresponse
in this case is to disengage from risks...". According to this channel, the 1998 Russia
4According to the authors: "One can think of these [risk tolerant] leveraged investors as banks or
the nancial sector more broadly, including hedge funds."
5In the words of the authors: "We will use our theory to argue that the periodic problems faced by
emerging asset classes are sometimes symptoms of what we call a global anxious economy rather than
of their own fundamental weaknesses."
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default caused a jump in the spreads of Brazilian bonds, two countries that had little
economic relationship with each other but were both labeled as emerging economies, be-
cause investors become uncertain about the fundamentals of the whole class of emerging
market assets and made decisions based on worst-case scenarios. Cúrdia (2008) uses a
mechanism of this type to generate a sudden stop in his work about optimal monetary
policy in emerging economies.
The international loan to a domestic borrower is risky because foreign investors
face the possibility of default. We follow the same simple approach as Neumeyer and
Perri (2005) and assume that private domestic borrowers always repay their debt. Note
that this is consistent with the model presented here as long as the net worth of banks
remain positive6. However, each period there is a probability that the local government
conscates payments going from local borrowers to foreign investors. Variations in this
probability generates movements in the domestic factor t .
Instead of modeling this conscation probability, we directly map t into do-
mestic variables. In particular, we follow García-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010) and
assume that t depends on the net foreign asset position of the country
7:
t = ( Bt )	 (2.24)
where  Bt is the net foreign debt of the country and the parameter 	 determines
the degree of nancial imperfection. This equation implies that the spread over the
international rate is increasing with the aggregate indebtness of the economy.
6There is no idiosyncratic shocks and hence the net worth of an individual bank would become
negative only if the net worth of the whole banking system is wiped-out. This doesnt occurs in of our
simulations.
7This dependence reects nancial frictions and is beyond what is necessary to close an open
economy as suggest by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003)
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Wholesale Firms
At each period, identical wholesale rms start with a given level of physical
capital (Kt 1), hire labor (Lt) to produce the home good (YH;t) and sell their production






where At is the total factor productivity.
After production takes place, the rm can sell its depreciated level of capital
back to the capital producers at the market price level Qt. Since it costs one unit of the
consumption good to repair a unit of depreciated capital, the wholesale rm receives
(Qt   )Kt 1 from this sale.
The last operational activity of the rm is to acquire capital from capital pro-
ducers to be used next period. To fund this investment, the rms sell securities to
nancial intermediaries. By assumption, they issue only equity claims to fund their
investment in physical capital. For example, at the end of period t, wholesale rms
sell a total value of QtKt securities to buy an identical value of physical capital. The
abstraction from debt contracts here is a simplication. In the presence of default, debt
contracts would also be state contingent. The assumption of equity-nancing allows us
to capture the fact that the return on the assets of banks depend on the protability
of rms and asset prices. Finally, given that the market is competitive, wholesale rms
earn zero prot state by state and simply return all the prots to the buyers (banks)
of these equity securities
All these decisions and transactions take place at the beginning of the period.
However, a friction in the payments technology implies that wholesale rms receive a
fraction w of their revenues only at the end of the period. As a consequence, wholesale
rms need working capital from banks to operate. For that purpose, rms issue bonds
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at the beginning of the period and repay them at the end. The interest rate on these
bonds (Rw;t) is risk free because they are intraperiod without repayment uncertainty.
Prot maximization in the presence of working capital implies that the demand





)pw;tYH;t = Ltwt (2.26)
where pw;t is the real wholesale price of the home good, and wt is the real wage.










A continuum of retail rms, owned by the households, indexed by i 2 [0; 1], buy
the home good from the wholesale rms and transform it, with a linear technology at no
additional cost, into their own variety. Firms operate in a monopolistically competitive
environment and prices are sticky à la Calvo. Every period, rms reset their price with
probability (1  p).
The total aggregate demand for the domestic good is given by
YH;t = CH;t + IH;t + C

H;t (2.28)
where CH;t is the demand from the domestic consumers, IH;t is the investment demand,









where P H;t is the foreign price of the domestic good and C

t is an exogenous shifter in the
foreign demand for home goods. The law of one price holds and hence P H;t = PH;t=St.
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The nal home good is assumed to be a composite made of a continuum of dif-
































((1  ) PH;t(i)  Pw;t+j) (2.32)
where we use the stochastic discount factor of the household.






















Finally, the aggregate domestic price index is given by
PH;t = [(1  p)( PH;t)1  + p(PH;t 1)1 ]
1
1  : (2.34)
2.2.2 Capital Producing Firms
Capital producers buy used capital from the intermediate producers, repair the
depreciated capital and build new capital. The cost of refurbishing used capital is a unit
of the consumption good, but to build new units, in additional to a unit consumption
cost, the capital producers incur on an adjustment cost.
8The term (1  ) allows for a subsidy to eliminate the monopoly distortion at the steady state.
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where In;t = It   Kt 1 is the net investment (i.e new capital), and Iss is the steady
state level of investment. The function f() provides the cost of adjusting the capital
level and has the following properties: f(1) = f 0(1) = 0 and f 00(1) > 0.
The solution to this problem yields the Q price of capital
















The government is a single entity composed by the treasury and the central bank.
Together, they control four variables: the nominal interest rate (it), a lump-sum tax
on households (Tt), the supply of government bonds (Bg;t) and the credit interventions
(Dg;t).
We impose two restrictions on the government. The rst is a standard budget
constraint
Tt = Dg;t  Bg;t + (Rt 1Bg;t 1  Rg;t 1Dg;t 1) (2.37)
where is Rg;t is the real interest rate received by the central bank on its credit interven-
tions.
A second condition restricts the interventions in credit markets to be sterilized.
As a consequence, any change in the volume of assets on the consolidated government
balance sheet requires an equivalent change in the amount of government bonds on the
liability side:
Dg;t = Bg;t (2.38)
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Taken together, these restrictions imply that the government has two indepen-
dent instruments: the nominal interest rate it and the credit interventions. We discuss
in details the credit intervention in section 2.4.
For the interest rate, we assume that the Central Bank follows a Taylor Rule
type of policy








where it is the nominal interest rate, Y nt is the exible price level of product, i
n
t is the
exible price (real) interest rate and H;t is the ination of the home good.
Exogenous Shocks
There are three exogenous shocks in the model: one domestic and two interna-
tional. The former is a stationary productivity shock At. We include this mainly to
show that the response of the economy is similar to the ones in closed economy models
with a nancial accelerator mechanism.
The external shocks are the term Rt in the international interest (2.23) and the
variable Ct in the foreign demand (2.29). The former represents an external nancial
shock while the latter is a simple way to capture exogenous movements in the terms of
trade.
We assume that these three shocks are independent of each other and follow an
AR(1) process. Section 2.2.4 discusses their calibration.
Equilibrium
Market clearing in the domestic nancial market imposes that
SK;t = QtKt + wpw;tYH;t (2.39)
90
where SK;t is the value of the securities issued by the wholesale rms. The right hand
side of the equation gives the total amount of resources required by wholesale rms to
fund their investment and working capital needs.
In equilibrium, rms always need the two types of capital9. Banks are willing













The resource constraint of the home good is given by







Aggregating the budget constraints of households and the government, and re-
placing the prot functions as necessary, one can derive the balance of payments (in
terms of the foreign currency)
P H;tC

H;t   CF;t   IF;t = Bt  	t 1Bt 1 (2.42)
where IF;t is the imported foreign good component of investments.
Appendix B.1 lists all the equations that determine the dynamic equilibrium of
the economy.
2.2.4 Solution Method and Calibration
We solve for the dynamic rational expectations equilibrium using standard rst
order perturbation methods. A period in the model is a quarter and there are 22
9There is one important technicality regarding the working capital funding. As described in section
2.2.1, rms repay banks at the end of the period. We assume that from the end of one period to the
beginning of the next, banks hold the total amount of this repayment as a non-interest rate asset (for
example, money issued by the central bank). This assumption justies the payment of interest rate on
intraperiod loans and is compatible with the balance sheet constraint of banks.
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parameters to calibrate. Table 1 lists all of them and their calibrated values. For those
parameters that we can directly match to moments in the data, we use gures from
Brazil.
First, we start with the description of the more conventional parameters, whose
values we take from the literature on nominal DSGE models calibrated or estimated for
emerging economies. We set the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
() to 1, the inverse of the labor supply elasticity ( ) equal to 1 and the inverse
elasticity of net investment to the price of capital to 1.728. The value of the export
price elasticity (v) commonly varies from the fairly inelastic 0.6 in Cúrdia (2008)
and Cook (2004) to perfectly elastic in Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) and Braggion,
Christiano, and Roldos (2009). Perfect elasticity is also true for most of the papers in
the emerging market real business cycle literature, where the world is assumed to absorb
any quantity exported at the international price. Here we follow Céspedes, Chang, and
Velasco (2004), Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) and Elekdag, Justiniano, and
Tchakarov (2006) and choose a median value of 1. With respect to the nominal part of
the model, in line with the estimations in Elekdag, Justiniano, and Tchakarov (2006),
we use 2/3 for the degree of price stickiness (p) and 8 for the elasticity of substitution
across the di¤erent varieties of home goods ().
To calibrate the labor coe¢ cient in the production function (), the depreciation
of capital () and the preference bias for home goods () we use the Brazilian national
accounts. These coe¢ cients are set, respectively, to 0.611, 0.0149 and 0.861 to match
the share of labor on total output (0.60), investment expenditures (0.17) and the GDP
share of imports (0.11). All these shares were computed from post-1995 data, after the
economy was stabilized by the Real Plan.
We now turn to the parameters regarding the domestic nancial portion of the
model: the fraction of assets the banker can successfully divert (), the fraction of the
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total amount of assets in the economy transferred to new bankers as start-up capital
() and the random fraction of the bankers who become workers in each period (1  ).
These parameters are set to match three steady values. First, commercial and invest-
ment banks in Brazil hold assets that are on average 9 times the size of their net worth.
Leverage in the corporate sector is much smaller and gravitates around10. However,
most of the credit ow to companies, as well as consumers, is provided by banks, while
the domestic capital markets remains largely devoted to government related securities.
To capture this high dependence on the banking system, a feature that is also common
in other emerging market economies, we target a steady state ratio of assets to capital
of 6.
Second, the average domestic corporate spread from 2004 to 2007, a nancially
and economically stable period in Brazil, was 13.7% in annual terms. However, a large
fraction of this rate might be attributed to other factors than the theory presented
in section 2.2.1. Indeed, Costa (2004) estimates that prots accounts for between 9%
and 34% of the spreads charged by banks in Brazil, while the remaining fraction can
be attributed to taxation, reserves requirement, default rates and operational costs.
Therefore, we set the steady state "ine¢ cient" spread, which is the one explained by
our model, to 3.4% in annual terms, or 25% of the total spread observed in the data.
The third and last value we target with the parameters of the domestic nancial
sector is the average life of banks. The main economic role of this average life in the
model is to limit the ability of banks to adjust their capital level. As a consequence, we
should not direct associate it with actual average life of banks in data. In lack of better
10Brazilian rm level studies (Terra (2003) and Bonacim, Ambrozini, and Nagano (2006)) have
computed an average ratio of debt-to-assets of about 0.35. These studies are, however, somewhat
outdated, with the most recent one covering rms only up to 2004. Since then, the volume of corporate
credit as percentage of GDP in the country has almost doubled. Therefore, we consider a rate of 0.5,
a number close to the value used by Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006), which is itself based on rm-level
studies for Asian economies
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guidance, at this point, we set the average bank life to 10 quarters in order to keep the
fraction of assets the banker can successfully divert () at a not too high level11.
For the curvature of the international credit supply curve, 	, we set it such
that, as estimated in García-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010), at the steady-state,
an increase of 1pp (percentage point) in foreign debt as a share of GDP raises the
international spread by around 0.5pp. In addition, we also set the steady state level of
foreign debt to match the ratio of foreign to total liabilities in the Brazilian banking
sector. This ratio has varied from almost 0.15 in the late 90s to 0.03 in 2009. Here we
set it at 0.06, which is the value at the end 2007.
In terms of the Taylor Rule followed by the monetary authority in setting the
policy rate, we x  = 2 and y = 0:75. These values are common in the literature
and provide a good description of the exible ination target rule currently in place in
Brazil.
Furthermore, we choose to normalize, without loss of generality, the steady-
state value of output and the terms of trade to 1. The rst assumption determines
the household disutility of labor ~L, and the second sets the steady-state value of the
exogenous component in the foreign demand for domestic goods (Ct ). Finally, the
household time discounting () is set to equal 0.99. This results in a 4% annual domestic
policy (or saving) real interest rate, which, for simplicity, we also assume to be the
international interest rate.
Finally, for the exogenous processes, estimating a simple AR(1) process for the
international spread statistics collected by the Central Bank results in an autocorrela-
tion coe¢ cient of 0.93. This value is consistent with the more elaborate law of motion
11With the choice of parameters above, we have that  = 0:32378, meaning that the banker can
deviate almost 32% of the banks assets. See Gertler and Karadi (2011) for a discussion about this
issue.
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of sovereign spreads in Latin American countries estimated by Fernández-Villaverde,
Guerrón-Quintana, Rubio-Ramirez, and Uribe (2010). Therefore, we set the autocor-
relation of Rt to 0.9. For C







t . Hence we can use the value of exports in foreign currency to t a process
for Ct . Using quarterly data for Brazilian exports since 1960 yields a autocorrelation
of 0.898. In the case of the stationary productivity shock At, we just assume that the
autocorrelation is 0.9.
2.3 Understanding the Role of the Domestic Finan-
cial Sector
Figures 1 and 2 show the dynamics of selected variables in response to exoge-
nous shocks. The case of a negative a domestic technology shock, displayed in Figure
1, illustrates the basic mechanism of the model. Without frictions in the domestic -
nancial sector, an 25 basis point decrease in At has the negative impact in the economy
through well-know channels. These impacts are shown in the graphs by the line labelled
"Standard DSGE", which is a version of model without the domestic nancial frictions
described in Section 2.2.1.
As one can see in the graphs, the presence of domestic nancial frictions (baseline
model labelled as "Financial Decelerator") propagates the initial shock. The mecha-
nism is straightforward, the initial negative performance of the economy a¤ects the
balance sheet of banks, increasing their leverage ratio and, hence, impacting the do-
mestic spreads . This increase in spreads further depress the demand by rms for labor
and investment. The rst because rms require working capital to pay workers and the
second because rms issue securities to fund their capital expenditures. As can be seen
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in the top graph on the left, these factor amplies the output fall.
For the purposes of this paper, however, it is more important to understand and
quantify the amplication e¤ects of the domestic nancial sector when the economy is
hit by external shocks. In the case of an increase in the international rates available to
domestic borrowers the impacts are signicant. As Figure 2a shows, an 1% (annualized)
rise in the Rt depress GDP by about 0.1% in quarterly terms in the Standard DSGE
model, compared to a fall of over 0.2% when frictions in the domestic banking system
are included. For the same reasons as before, most of the fall comes from increase in
the nancial costs associated with investing and hiring workers. Note that, in the case
of consumption, the di¤erence between the two models is small.
One can also observe in the graphs of Figure 2a, that the decline in the net worth
of banks come mostly from the negative impact of the fall in assets prices on the return
on the assets held by banks (the second graph on the third row). Indeed, banks hold
stocks issued by the rms. Log-linearizing equation (2.27), which gives the gross return
of investing on rms, results in the following expression
RK r^K;t = (1  )k 1y

p^w;t + y^t   k^t 1   q^t 1   r^w;t

+ (q^t   (1  )q^t 1) (2.43)
where x^ denotes log-deviation from steady state, RK the value of Rk;t in steady state
and ky is the capital to output ratio, also in the steady state. Under the baseline
calibration, ky equals to 11.4 and, as consequence, most of the movement in r^K;t comes
from the second term on the right hand side of the above equation. With q^t 1 = 0 in
the initial period of the shock, the decline in q^t translates into a direct impact12 on
r^K;t, which has a large e¤ect on the balance sheet of banks. This interaction between
asset prices and balance sheet has been highlighted by many economist as an important
12Note that in the Figure 2a, the return on banks assets is annualized. Therefore the fall of 1% in
qt reects into a rk;t close to  4%a:a: in the rst period of the shock.
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aspect to understand the role played by the nancial sector during recessions.
In the case of a decline in the foreign demand for the domestic good the domestic
nancial sector has a somewhat smaller role in propagating the initial shock. This can
be seen in Figure 2b, which reports impulse response function to a decline of 2.2% in
Ct . With this value the initial recession cause by a shock to the international spread
is the same as the originated for the foreign demand under the Standard DSGE model.
However, the fall in output is much latter case compared to the former under the
Financial Accelerator model. It is in this sense (same e¤ect without domestic friction
but smaller with frictions) that we consider that the domestic banking system plays a
reduced role in propagating exogenous shocks to the terms of trade (which, as mentioned
before, is captured by Ct in the model).
This less important role is not a structural feature of the model as it depends on
the characteristics of the economy given by its calibration. For example, a deterioration
in the terms of trade causes a large exchange depreciation. If domestic banks rely sig-
nicantly on foreign debt, which are denominated in foreign currency, this depreciation
has a larger impact on the banks balance sheet. In the baseline calibration, foreign
debt accounts for only 6% of banks liabilities. But this gure reached 15% in Brazil
in the past and may also be larger in other countries. Figure 2c, compares the results
when this ratio in the steady state is 6% (Baseline Calibration) with the case when it is
equal to 30% (Larger Foreign Liabilities). As can be seen, the domestic banking system
in the latter amplies signicantly the initial shock. The main di¤erence is that, even
with a similar levels of exchange rate depreciations in both cases, with higher levels
of foreign debt the ex-post cost of the banks debt (graphs at the bottom) is higher.
Amplication might also be larger in economies that are more exported oriented, as is
the case of, for example, some countries in Asia.
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Observations on Business Cycles
This paper is not a complete description of business cycles in emerging market
economies. However, simulating the economy and generating some basic business cycle
statistics further highlights the main properties of the model. In addition, it also
demonstrates that the model captures well important characteristics of these economies.
Two important properties of business cycle in emerging market economies are
the higher volatility of consumption growth when compared to output growth and
the negative correlation between the trade balance-to-output ratio ("tby") and output
growth. Table 2 shows that this is the case not just of Brazil, but also of other countries
in Latin America13.
The same table contains the real business cycle statistics generated by the Stan-
dard DSGE and Financial Accelerator models. The reported values come from 500000
simulations using the baseline calibration presented in section 2.2.4. The only exception
is that we shut down the nominal parts of the model. We set the standard deviations of
the exogenous technology, foreign demand for the home good and international spread
shocks to match, respectively, the standard deviations of output, terms of trade and
international spread in the quarterly data for Brazil in the period from 1991 to 2010.
The statistics from simulating the baseline model (second column in the table)
are in line with the data. In particular, the standard deviation of consumption growth is
higher than the one for output growth and the tby-output growth correlation is negative.
The domestic frictions are not essential to generate the former. In fact, the standard
model without domestic nancial intermediation (rst column) already matches this
aspect of the data. However, the inclusion of the domestic nancial system improves
signicantly the performance of the model with respect to tby-output growth correla-
13The only exception is Chile, which has positive correlation between tby and output.
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tion by taking this measure into the negative territory (-0.06 compared to 0.01 in the
Standard DSGE version). As discussed above, the presence of domestic frictions have
a higher amplication e¤ect in response to shocks to the international borrowing rate.
Since this shock generates a strong negative tby-output growth correlation (compare
the paths of net exports and output in gures 2a and 2b), amplifying the e¤ects of inter-
national spreads shocks result on average negative value for this statistics. Finally, note
that the domestic frictions also increases the investment volatility, bringing it closer to
the values observed in the data.
The model presented here is not the rst to be able to match the mentioned
main features of business cycle in emerging economies. But its reassuring that it does.
Moreover, by improving upon the more standard model, it provides an alternative
explanation for these characteristics14.
2.4 Unconventional Monetary Policies
In this section, we study the e¤ects of unconventional policies. These involve
direct interventions in credit or securities markets. At this point, we focus on the
positive approach of describing the dynamics under alternative policies and abstract
from a normative discussion based on welfare evaluation
The central bank intervenes in credit markets by acquiring the securities issued
by the wholesale rms. The aim is to alleviate conditions in nancial markets: the
short term working capital facilities and the long term contracts to fund investment.
A rst observation is that in both cases the central bank acts at the prevailing market
14See, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and García-Cicco,
Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010) for discussions about the data and the driving forcers behind them.
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prices. The only operating channel of any intervention is its general equilibrium e¤ect
on spreads as the volume of intermediation by the private sector varies.
The reduction in spreads is possible because the central bank is not subject
to the same information and enforcement frictions a¤ecting banks. There might be
direct costs associated with the credit procedures of the central bank. The assumption
is that these costs are di¤erent than the ones associated with market intermediation.
Two other underlying assumptions are that these costs are high enough to discourage
interventions outside crises episodes and that the central bank doesnt need to impose
these costs on the borrowers. The absence of these costs in the model are less important
for the positive questions considered here.
To incorporate credit interventions, assume that the central bank acquires a total
value Scb;t of securities. These assets are composed by the two types of assets held by
banks, in the same proportion as they are available in the economy. Government bonds
issued to households fund these acquisitions.
The the value of banksassets is now given by SK;t   Scb;t. Denote by cb;t the
fraction of the securities in the economy held by the central bank (i.e cb;tSK;t = Scb;t).





Note that "total leverage" and "private leverage" in the economy can di¤er. The
latter is provided by nancial intermediaries and is equal to t. The former includes the
o¢ cial interventions and, when these occur, it increases the total amount of leverage
(t=(1  cb;t) > t if cb;t > 0).
We assume that the central bank set cb;t to zero in "normal" times. However,
when the domestic spreads are high, it chooses a positive value. In determining the
importance of this policy in "crisis", we convert the total central bank-sponsored loans
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where RS=RD is the steady state spread.
Figure 3 shows the impact of the credit interventions. In all experiments, we set
cb = 20, which, as pointed below, generates limited interventions in the economy.
In the case of external shocks, rst consider an increase of 6% (annualized rate)
on the international borrowing rate available to domestic banks. This is an increase
of the size observable in some emerging market economies during the global nancial
crisis of 2007-2009. This shock can also be associated with the surge in capital outows
emphasized by the sudden stops literature, although an increase of 6% in international
spreads is smaller than the jumps observed during these episodes in the 90s and early
2000s.
The intervention signicantly mitigates the negative e¤ects of the shock. As can
be seen in gure 3a, it reduces the initial GDP fall by almost 30%. As mentioned before,
the policy works through the general equilibrium e¤ects on domestic spreads. The fall
on these spreads increase asset prices, improve the net worth of banks, the volume of
the credit and, as consequence, amplify the benets. Note that, at its maximum, o¢ cial
credit correspond to 5% of the volume of credit.
Two interesting observations can also be made. First, among the two variables
that depend on credit, the intervention benets more employment than investment.
This suggests that short term credit markets to nance working capital is an impor-
tant channel through each the policy a¤ects the economy. Second, many important
variables, like the real exchange rate, interest rates and ination, are not signicantly
a¤ected. This result indicates that the central bank can a¤ect conditions in credit
markets without distorting other prices.
101
In the case of a negative shock to exports, gure 3b shows that the benets of
the policies are smaller. This is the other side of the small propagation role played by
the domestic nancial markets in response to this type of shock, as discussed in section
2.3.
Given the important role played by domestic banks, credit interventions are most
powerful against shocks that have large impact on their balance sheets. This explains
the di¤erences discussed above. A purely nancial shock that directly a¤ects the net
worth of banks is another case in which credit interventions is e¤ective. An example
of this type of shock occurs when banks su¤er heavy loss in some of its assets. In an
international context, this loss could come from assets held abroad and uncorrelated
with the domestic economy. During the nancial crisis of 2007-09, this was an important
channel propagating the US subprime mortgage crisis to Europe, as European banks
su¤ered large losses from their holdings in the US. The model presented here is suitable
to study these transmissions mechanisms.
2.5 Conventional Monetary Policies
A complete discussion of conventional monetary policy, including optimal welfare-
based analysis, is beyond the goals of this paper. Nevertheless, it is interesting to ask
what the model has to say about the adoption of di¤erent interest rate rules. In the
context of external shocks, there is a large debate in the literature and among poli-
cymakers about what is the best policy during periods of strong reversal in external
capital inows (i.e. a sudden stops episodes).
The model presented here is adequate to re-address this debate because it ex-
plicitly includes a domestic banking system, which are often at the epicenter of these
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episodes (see, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). Moreover, in the model,
external borrowing is done by banks. This is also the usual picture in the data. As
a consequence when international interest rates rise signicantly and/or the exchange
rate depreciates (foreign-currency denomination of external debt is usual case in devel-
oping countries) the health of domestic banks is strongly jeopardized. These balance
sheet e¤ects have been documented as been extremely important (see, Calvo 1998 and
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía 2007). Even though banks are crucial to explain the sever-
ity of sudden stops, so far, the literature has dealt with this issue only indirectly by
incorporating nancial frictions at the rm level.
In addition to the baseline Taylor rule, we consider two types of policies: a xed
nominal exchange rate (or hard peg) and an ination targeting regime. In the case of
the former, Calvo Guillermo and Reinhart (2002) discusses why countries might want to
smooth exchange rate movements. Blanchard, Faruqee, and Das (2010) is an evidence
that such views remain popular. Among other reasons, xing the nominal exchange
rate has been defended on the grounds that the foreign-currency denomination of the
external debt creates recessionary balance sheet e¤ects when the currency depreciates.
Most of the literature using DSGE type of models has not favored this view and usually
concludes that a more exible exchange rate regimes is preferable (see discussions in
Cúrdia 2008). But as mentioned before, contrary to our paper, these works dont
include a domestic banking system.
Ination targeting regimes have been adopted by many emerging market economies.
Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella (2004) discusses the adoption and challenges of ination
targeting in these economies while Gonçalves and Salles (2008) nd empirical evidence
in favour of this type of regime. However, during a sudden stop, large exchange rate
depreciation and the associated pass-trough to domestic prices have led some countries
to be more exible with respect to their ination target (see discussions in Fraga, Gold-
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fajn, and Minella 2004 and Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2004). Here we re-address the
e¤ects of ination target during sudden stops with a focus on it e¤ects in the domestic
nancial system.
According to our experiments, during a sudden stop, the baseline Taylor rule
dominates other policies in terms of GDP performance. The rst column of gure 4
shows the impulse responses to a large shock to the international borrowing rate Rt
that generates a large capital outow. This is an easy away to generate a sudden stop
in the model.
Both the ination targeting and xed exchange rate regimes imply higher real
interest rate. The former because the exchange rate devaluation generates a higher
domestic ination and hence forces the central bank to push rates up to keep ination
at its target. The latter because to defend the nominal exchange rate the central bank
has also to increase rates to attract capital or contain its outow.
Higher interest rate causes a recession without frictions in the domestic banking
system. In the presence of these, the e¤ects are larger. The higher rates depress asset
prices and harm rms prots. Both e¤ects, in particular the former, produce negative
returns on the assets of banks, reduce their net worth, decrease the volume of credit
and increase spreads.
Note that in the hard peg regime the central bank is able to contain the real
exchange rate depreciation. This decreases the ex-post real cost of banks debt and,
hence, provide some relief. This is exactly the goal of those who defend the control of
the exchange rate. However, the negative e¤ects on the asset side are stronger and the
net e¤ect is a decline in the net worth of banks.
The e¤ects just described can be stronger under alternative functional assump-
tions. For example, the second column in gure 4 shows the case of CRRA preferences.
With a xed exchange rate regime the declines in assets prices and in the net worth
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of banks are twice as are larger than the falls under the baseline Taylor rule. This
di¤erence explains most of the larger fall in output under these regimes.
The conclusions with respect to the xed exchange rate regime hold even if for-
eign debt represents a larger fraction of banks liabilities. In the last column of gure
4, foreign debt represents 30% of the total debt (against 6% in the baseline calibra-
tion). In this case, exchange rate depreciation has an stronger impact on the liabilities.
Nonetheless, pegging the nominal exchange rate still generates a larger recession. The
associated larger capital outow demands higher interest rate to defend the exchange
rate. These higher rates produce even sharper falls in assets prices. Again, the negative
e¤ects suppress the benets of lowering the real exchange rate depreciation.
Finally, we also consider a Taylor rule responding to both ination and the nom-
inal exchange rate. This specication allows some room for both variables to increase
during crisis. In all cases consider in gure 4, the baseline Taylor rule still delivers a
higher output dynamics.
The results above clearly point in the direction that not allowing the exchange
rate to depreciate during periods of large capital outows is a mistake. This was also
the conclusion, as already mentioned, in the some of the previous literature. There are,
however, two important qualications to be made. First, the usual recommendation is
actually to try to control for vary large depreciations and stabilize the exchange rate
at some level rather than simply keep it constant (see again Blanchard, Faruqee, and
Das (2010)). Here the exchange rate depreciation is not as large as observed during
some of the crises in during the 90s and early 2000s. Therefore it is still possible
that after some level it becomes desirable to control the exchange rate. Second, here,
increasing the nominal interest rate is the only instrument available to the central
bank. And this is exactly what causes the decline on the value of the assets held by
banks. However, in practice, central bank also use other instruments like intervention in
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exchange rate markets (using, for example, their holdings of foreign reserves) or impose
capital controls. In any case, the general massage remains. Policymakers must not just
focus on the liabilities or assets of banks. All e¤ects must be simultaneously considered.
2.6 Crisis Experiment - Brazil in the Great Reces-
sion of 2008-09
Starting in the last quarter of 2008, as most emerging market economies, Brazil
faced a combination of a nancial shock, which increased the interest rates available to
domestic borrowers in international markets, and a negative terms of trade shock. The
international spreads available to private borrowers surged as much as 6% in annual
terms while the US dollar value of exports declined by 40% in two quarters (see the
rst two graphs in the top row of gure 5). This mix of negative shocks had a large
impact on growth. At its trough in the1th quarter of 2009, output was -6.86% below
the previous trend.
The government was also very active in reacting to the crisis. Most interesting
for our purposes, it adopted a series of measures to alleviate conditions in credit mar-
kets15. In one of these policies the treasury transferred funds to the government-owned
development bank, BNDES, so that it could increase its loans to companies. In 2009,
the transfers totalled 3% of the GDP or close to 7% of the total volume of credit in the
economy at the time.
We use our model to study the impact of this policy. First we plug into the
model shocks to the terms of trade and to the international rates that reproduce the
15The Treasury also put into practice a hefty agenda of countercyclical scal policies and the central
bank did a series of interventions in the spot and forward exchange rate markets. We choose not to
include them in our experiments in order to better frame the credit policy analysis.
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paths of exports (measured in US dollar) and foreign spreads in the data. Then we
consider a version of the model with credit policy as described in 2.4 such that, at its
peak, 7% of the total credit in the economy is intermediated by the central bank. To
compare, we also considered a version of the model without credit policy.
As can be seen in gure 5, the model roughly replicates the behavior of the main
variables in the data. It perform wells, in particular, in the nancial variables (i.e. the
domestic spread), but relatively poorly in the nominal ones like ination. But given
the complexity of the shocks and policies at the time, the overall performance is quite
good.
The conclusions about the credit policy are mixed. We judge its impact by
looking at the output performance, the main goal of the Brazilian authorities at the
time. Comparing the GDP paths generated by the model with and without the policy,
we reckon that, in the rst quarter of the crisis, the policy improved output by 23%.
But in the second quarter, at the trough of the recession, the improvement was of only
8.7%: an increase in GDP from -7.72% below the steady state to -7.05%. From then
onward the impact is negligible.
Initially, the interest rate was the main shock hitting the economy. But since
the beginning of 2009 the decline in exports was the most important factor behind the
recession. The results from the previous sections indicate that, at least in the case of
Brazil, the domestic nancial sector is less important in propagating this type of shock.
As a consequence the credit policy is less benecial.
It could be the case that the domestic banks were hit by other channels than
the ones considered here (protability of the exporting sector, asset prices movements,
banks borrowing cost and balance sheet position of banks). But we included the ones
that most economist considered relevant during the time. Therefore, we end this case
study with a word of caution about the desirability of credit policy in Brazil in response
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to international shocks that are predominantly related to the terms of trade.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we constructed a small open economy model with a domestic
banking system. The model is general and can be used to address several questions
that involves a signicant role for the nancial sector. We gave some examples of that by
addressing some questions relating to monetary policy. In this sense the paper belongs
to a broader agenda in macroeconomics that aim to incorporate nancial intermediation
in quantitative models.
The main question we answer can be stated as following: do credit policies have
a role to play in the management of economic crises originated outside the country?
And if yes, how important are these policies?" To answer the rst part, we argued that
interventions might make sense if the external shocks have large impact on the balance
sheets of domestic banks and if the central bank is not restricted in the same way that
private agents are. A banking sector a la Gertler and Karadi (2011) is a case where
such features occur. Once the basic rationale for the intervention is understood, the
main e¤ort is to quantify its importance.
In this aspect we highlight four main channels linking the external shocks to the
domestic nancial sector. First, terms of trade a¤ect the protability of the corporate
sector and hence banks return on assets. Second, an increase in the international in-
terest rate depresses asset prices and reduces the prot of banks. Third, international
rates also a¤ect banks borrowing cost. And for last, exchange rate depreciations as-
sociated with both types shocks weakens the balance sheet position of banks because
they usually are the domestic agent who borrows from abroad.
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According to our calibration, the main channel is the second one: an increase
in the international interest rate depresses asset prices and reduces the prot of banks.
The simulations show that the fall in output is twice as large in the model with domestic
nancial frictions when compared to a model without domestic banks.
Given that the amplication is higher for this type of shock, it is not surprising
that credit policies are more e¤ective in this case. To quantify the importance of the
intervention we assume that central bank acquires the securities issued by the wholesale
rms at the prevailing market prices. By reducing domestic spreads, the policy also
increases asset prices, improves the net worth of banks, the volume of the credit and
further minimizes the impact of the shock. Our simulations show that the intervention
can reduce by almost 30% the GDP fall in response to a large increase in international
rates. In the case of a negative shock to exports, the benets are smaller.
The nal exercise, a case study of Brazil during the crisis, shows that some
of the policies implemented in the country had limited impact in improving output
because the decline in terms of trade was the main shock for the economy and this
has not a large impact on its domestic banks. This should be read as a warning
to policymakers: account qualitatively and quantitatively for the domestic nancial
frictions before engaging in credit interventions.
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2.8 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Parameters in the Model
The table describes all the parameters in the model and their baseline calibration
Parameter Value Description
Conventional parameters calibrated from the literature in emerging market economies
s 1 inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
y 1 inverse of the labor supply elasticity
n* 1 exports price elasticity
h 8 elasticity of substitution across the different varieties of home goods
f’’(1) 1.728 Inverse elasticity of net investment to the price of capital
ap 2/3 probability of a retail firm not being able to adjust its price
hF 0.1675 +1% in D*/Y⇒ +0.5% in the country spread
fp 2 response of the policy rate to inflation
fy 0.75 response of the policy rate to output
Parameters calibrated to match moments of the Brazilian data in the steady state
a 0.611 labor coefficient in the production functions (set to match the GDP share oflabor: 0.60)
d 0.01492 depreciation (GDP share of investment expenditures: 0.17)
g 0.861 home good bias (share of imports: 0.11)
b 0.99 time discounting (international spread of 4% over world risk free rate,which was normalized to 0)
B*/Y -0.887 foreign assets position as a share of quarterly GDP (ratio of foreign to totalliabilities in the Brazilian banking sector
x 0.00066 start-up capital (assets / net worth = 6)
l 0.32378 fraction of assets a banker can deviate (annual spread: 3.4%)
q 0.90 fraction of bankers who stay in their group (average firm life: 10 years)
Other parameters
L 0.21 disutility of working  (normalizes the steady-state output to 1)
C* 0.114 foreign demand (normalizes the steady-state terms of trade to 1)
rR* 0.9 autocorrelation of the international interest rate R*
r C* 0.9 autocorrelation of the foreign currency value of Brazilian exports
r A 0.9 autocorrelation of the stationary productivity shock
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Table 2.2: Real business cycle statistics
* Brazil (1950-2010). ** Brazil (1947-2010); Chile (1967-2006). The model-based
gures are drawn from 500000 simulations. Data sources. Brazil - Ipea Data;
Argentina and Mexico: statistics are taken directly from Garcia-Cicco, Pancrazi, and
Uribe (2010); Chile: gdp and tby from Garcia-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010),
consumption from
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data_sets_barro.
Standard Financial Brazil Brazil Argentina Chile Mexico
DSGE Model Frictions Model 1991-2011 1945-2010 1900-2005 1900-2006 1900-2005
Quarterly Quarterly Quarterly Annually Annually Annually Annually
std gdp 1.40 1.40 1.40 3.49 5.30 6.23 4.09
std cons / std gdp 1.22 1.37 1.30 1.42 1.42 1.49 1.50
std inv / std gdp* 1.44 1.98 3.34 2.93 3.77 - 4.86
corr(gdp, cons) 0.91 0.92 0.48 0.54 0.72 0.63 0.66
corr(gdp, inv)* 0.67 0.71 0.65 0.66 0.67 - 0.55
corr(gdp, tby)** 0.02 -0.06 - -0.15 -0.03 0.02 -0.20
corr(cons, tby)** 0.01 -0.05 - -0.29 -0.27 -0.08 -0.29
corr(inv, tby)* -0.13 -0.25 - -0.10 -0.19 - -0.07
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The gure shows the performance of selected variables in response to a 0.25%
decrease in At. The Financial Accelerator line corresponds to the baseline model, while
the Standard DSGE has the same structure of baseline model but without the domestic
frictions (i.e. no domestic nancial intermediation). The units in the vertical axis are
% deviations from the steady state. In the case of variables marked with an *, the units
are annualized percentage points deviation from the steady state. The horizontal axis
are the numbers of quarters after the initial shock.






























Financial Accelerator Standard DSGE
Figure 2.1: Figure 1 - Dynamics after a domestic technology shock
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Figure 2a - Dynamics after a shock to the international spreads
The gure shows the performance of selected variables in response to an 1%
(annualized) increase in Rt . The Financial Accelerator line corresponds to the baseline
model, while the Standard DSGE has the same structure of baseline model but without
the domestic frictions (i.e. no domestic nancial intermediation). The units in the
vertical axis are % deviations from the steady state. In the case of variables marked
with an *, the units are annualized percentage points deviation from the steady state.









































































Financial Accelerator Standard DSGE
Figure 2.2: Figure 2a - Dynamics after a shock to the international spreads
113
The gure shows the performance of selected variables in response to a decrease
of 3.7% in Ct . In the case of the Standard DSGE model, this fall has the same impact
in output as the shock to international spreads displayed in gure 2a. The units in the
vertical axis are % deviations from the steady state. In the case of variables marked
with an *, the units are annualized percentage points deviation from the steady state.









































































Financial Accelerator Standard DSGE
Figure 2.3: Figure 2b - Dynamics after a shock to the foreign demand for the home
good
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The gure shows the performance of selected variables in response to a shock
to Ct . The graphs on the left correspond to the Baseline calibration, while the ones
on the right, labeled Larger Foreign Liabilities, relate to a version in which foreign
debt represent 30% of the liabilities of domestic banks (compared to 6% in baseline
calibration). In both cases to shock is adjusted to generate the same initial impact of
output in the Standard DSGE model. The units in the vertical axis are % deviations
from the steady state. In the case of variables marked with an *, the units are annualized
percentage points deviation from the steady state. The horizontal axis are the numbers
of quarters after the initial shock.



























































Larger Foreign Liabilit ies















Financial Accelerator Standard DSGE
Figure 2.4: Figure 2c - Dynamics after a shock to the foreign demand for the home
good
115
The gure shows the performance of selected variables in response to an 6%
(annualized) increase in Rt , with and without intervention in credit markets. The
units in the vertical axis are % deviations from the steady state. In the case of variables
marked with an *, the units are annualized percentage points deviation from the steady
















































































With Credit Policy No Credit Policy
Figure 2.5: Figure 3a - Unconventional policies in response to a shock to the interna-
tional spreads
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The gure shows the performance of selected variables in response to a decrease
of 40% in Ct , with and without intervention in credit markets. The units in the vertical
axis are % deviations from the steady state. In the case of variables marked with an
*, the units are annualized percentage points deviation from the steady state. The












































































With Credit Policy No Credit Policy
Figure 2.6: Figure 3b - Unconventional policies in response to a shock to the foreign
demand for the home good
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The gure shows the performance of selected variables in response to an 6%
(annualized) increase in Rt , with and without intervention in credit markets. The units
in the vertical axis are log deviations from the steady state. In the case of variables
marked with an *, the units are annualized percentage points deviation from the steady





































































































Baseline Taylor Rule Inflation Target Peg Taylor +  Exchange Rate
Figure 2.7: Figure 4 - Conventional policies in response to a sudden stop in capital
inows
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The gure shows the performance of selected variables during the nancial crisis
of 2008-2009 in Brazil. The black line represents realized data, while the others are
generated by the model (the green line is the nancial accelerator model with credit
policies and the blue one is the same model but without policies). The exogenous
variables (exports and shock to the international spread) are set such the model with
policy is close to the data.












































































































































Data FA with Credit Policy FA without Credit Policy
Figure 2.8: Figure 5 - Crisis Experiment - The case of Brazil
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Chapter 3
Do Margin Requirements A¤ect
Asset Prices?
3.1 Introduction
A1 number of recent theoretical works show that margin requirements may im-
pact asset prices. Some examples are Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Gromb and
Vayanos (2009), Geanakoplos (2010) and Garleanu and Pedersen (2011). The key fea-
ture of these models is the consideration of leveraged positions which depend on margin
requirements. If in some periods a signicant fraction of agents are credit constrained,
that is, it is harder to buy assets on margin, an additional premium may be required
when investing.
The implication of these results are important not only to understand asset
1This Chapter was co-authored with Bruno C. Giovannetti.This study was initiated while the
authors were a¢ liated to Columbia University as Ph.D. students. The authors thank Andrew Ang,
Dennis Kristensen and Rodrigo Bueno for valuable comments. In addition, this paper has beneted
from suggestions received from the Columbia University Finance Colloquium. All possible errors are
our own responsability.
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prices. Some authors, such as Geanakoplos (2010) and Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Peder-
sen (2010), have been using these models to analyze the unconventional policies imple-
mented by the Fed during the 2007-2010 nancial crisis, when the size and composition
of the Feds balance sheet have su¤ered major changes. In January 2007, the Fed carried
basically US Treasury bills ($ 780 billion). During the great recession, however, a va-
riety of assets were included in the balance sheet in signicant amounts. For example,
commercial papers ($ 350 billion), repurchase agreements ($ 150 billion), mortgage-
backed securities ($ 1 trillion), Federal agency debt securities ($ 150 billion) and others
($ 100 billion).
As Geanakoplos (2010) argues, the negative e¤ect of margins on prices, together
with the fact that these elements feed back one each other, could justify such a radical
change in the Feds policy. According to him, during some periods, "the Fed must step
around the banks and lend directly to investors, at more generous collateral levels than
the private markets are willing to provide."
Moreover, the margin related premium may break the usual non arbitrage link
between the Fed fund rate and the rate of returns of other assets, a¤ecting the ability of
the monetary authority to promote an expansionary policy. This is noted by Ashcraft,
Garleanu, and Pedersen (2010). As we shall see below, the margin premium is the
product of the margin requirement and the cost of margin (weighted by the importance
of the leveraged agents in aggregate consumption). The cost of margin is equal to the
shadow cost of capital, which can be measured by the di¤erence between the uncollat-
eralized and the collateralized short term rates. The latter is closely related to the Fed
fund rate, while the former depends on the liquidity and credit conditions in the inter-
bank market. Hence, during a nancial crisis, when the margin constraints are binding,
a reduction in the Fed fund rate may not translate into a fall on the rate of returns of
other assets. The reason is that the consequently higher shadow cost of capital steep-
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ens the margin-return relation, and this increases the required return on assets with
high margin requirements. Since in bad periods margins are signicantly higher across
assets, the interest rate reduction can then have small e¤ect on the required return of
other assets in the economy.
In despite of the relevance of these theoretical results, there is still very few
empirical evidence supporting the relation between margins and prices. The theoretical
papers mentioned above provide some isolated examples for some individual assets.
For instance,Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) use the spread between corporate bonds
and credit default swaps, and the covered interest rate parity to empirically validate
their model. Ashcraft, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2010), in turn, show that when the
Fed o¤ered margins for some securities during the last nancial crisis2, such securities
had their required rate of returns decreased.
Although these are interesting empirical illustrations, we should look for more
general evidences of the existence of a margin factor. If a margin factor exists, this
should have economy-wide implications. This investigation is the goal of this paper.
First, in the time-series dimension, as we discuss, an aggregate margin factor
should be able to forecast future excess returns of the market portfolio. We test such
a prediction and nd favorable empirical evidence. For example, during periods of
nancial distress, a 1% increase in the margin requirement for the market portfolio
raises the expected excess return on the index in at least 1.8% per year. Additionally,
a 1% increase in annual the cost of buying on margins raises the expected excess return
in at least 2.7% per year. These e¤ects are controlled for other standard risk factors
2This was done through the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and the Term Securities Lending Fa-
cility (TSLF). With the rst program, the Fed o¤erd collateralized loans to depository institutions
at favorable margin requirements. With the second, the Fed o¤ered Treasury collateral (low margin)
to primary dealers in exchange for other high-margin collateral such as mortgage bonds and other
investment grade securities.
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such as price ratios (earnings-price, dividend-price, dividend yield), market volatility,
ination and the relative bill rate. Importantly, the impact of margins on future returns
is increasing on the cost of buying on margins, and vice-versa. This is a crucial aspect
of Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) model.
Second, with respect to the cross-section of returns, if Garleanu and Pedersen
(2011) theory is correct, stocks with high exposures to the cost of buying on margin
(controlled for other risk factors) should pay higher average returns. Our empirical
ndings are also favorable to this prediction. We construct portfolios on the basis of
(constant and time-varying) exposures of the stocks to the cost of buying on margin,
and compute their alphas. Under all specications, the portfolio with higher exposed
stocks has smaller alpha. For instance, considering the portfolios sorted on time-varying
loadings, the annualized alphas from the model including the Fama-French factors and
a momentum factor are equal to 11.3% (for the high-exposure portfolio) and to 3.9%
(for the low-exposure portfolio).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple theoret-
ical model that motivates the empirical work. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis.
Section 4 concludes.
3.2 The theoretical model
In this section we present a theoretical model, based on Garleanu and Pedersen
(2011), to motivate our empirical work. We summarize their model and refer to their
paper for a more detailed analysis, including how to solve for the general equilibrium.
The economy has two types of agents n 2 fa; bg. Agent a is the risk-averse type
and b is the brave one, with a smaller risk aversion, equal to one. Both agents have
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There are several risky assets in the economy. The price of risky asset i follows
a Geometric Brownian Motion process









In addition to the risky assets there are two riskless money market assets, both in
zero net supply. One represents borrowing and lending against collateral at the interest
rate rct and the other uncollateralized loans with interest rate r
u
t .
The rst type is available to all agents in the economy. For example, when one
investor takes a long position in a risky asset she can borrow in the collateralized loan
market. To do so she must make some collateral available to her broker. The amount
of required collateral is determined by the haircut applied by the broker. The haircut is
the margin requirement, denoted by mit; and determines how much of her own capital
she must use to make the initial investment. Similarly, if she takes a short position, she
must also deposit collateral as margin with her broker or at some exchange. In both
cases, the margin is computed as a fraction of the total position: if the agent invests a
fraction it of their wealth Wt in the risk asset i, she must deposit m
i
tjitjWt as margin.
Note again that she must deposit a positive margin whether she is long or short in the
asset. Finally, the margin deposits are remunerated at rct .
The uncollateralized loan market is a standard one. It is riskless as the col-
lateralized loan. However, only type b agents can contract uncollateralized loans and
therefore, as we show below, when this agent is capital constrained, the two interest
rates are di¤erent.
Every instant, each consumer can chose how much to consume (Ct), the fraction
of her wealth she wants to invest in the risky assets, and in the uncollateralized loan
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market (ut ). Any residual wealth is invested in the collateralized loan market. The




















Consumers take as given all prices and maximize (3.1) subject to (3.3) and,
because of the margins requirement,X
i
mitjitj+ ut  1: (3.4)






























The solution to this problem yields, in the case agent b is long in the risky asset
i, two conditions:
rut   rct =  t; (3.5)

















A similar problem is solved by agents of type a, with the only di¤erence that he
cannot chose ut . If we assume that his capital constraint is never biding, the solution
to his portfolio choice problem is given by it   rct = aC
a
t . Then aggregating across
consumers is straightforward and gives the main result from Garleanu and Pedersen
(2011) that motivates our empirical work.
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The risk premium of risky asset i; when only consumers of type b can be capital
constrained and are long in this asset, is given by a margin-based premium in addition
to the standard consumption-based premium,

























Equation (3.7) is the main testable implication of the model. It states that
the excess returns of any risky asset is composed of two terms. The rst term is the
standard risk premium in the CAPM literature: the product of the price of risk, which
is given by an average of the risk aversion of the di¤erent agents in the economy, and
the covariance between aggregate consumption and the return of the asset. The second
term is the novelty. Because some investors might be capital constrained and cannot
deposit additional margins, they require an additional premium to hold such an asset
in equilibrium.
This extra premium is a combination of three factors. First,  t is the shadow
cost of buying on margin, and measures how binding the capital constraint is. By
equation (3.5), it is given by the di¤erence of two interest rates rut   rct . The second
factor mit, is the margin requirement itself. The last term gives the importance of the
constrained investor in the economy. As emphasized by Garleanu and Pedersen (2011),
even though the consumption share of the type b can be small, xt can still be large
because it takes into account the di¤erences in risk aversion.
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3.3 Testable implications of the model
The model presented above has economy-wide implications, for both the time-
series and the cross-section of expected returns. These are investigated in this section.
3.3.1 Time-series testable implications
There are two direct consequences of equation (3.7) related to the time-series of
the market portfolio return. First, (a) during periods of nancial distress (when the
margin premium is relevant), both the margin requirement on the market portfolio and
the respective margin cost should positively forecast future returns. Second, (b) the
e¤ect of an increase in the margin cost should depend on the level of the margin and,
at the same time, the e¤ect of an increase in margin requirements should depend on
the cost of buying on margin.
We can test implications (a) and (b) by estimating the regression
rt+h   rct+h = 0 + 1mt + 2 t + 3xtmt t + z0t4 + et+h; (3.10)
where rt+h and rct+h are the h-month ahead risky (S&P 500) and collateralized risk-free
returns respectively, et+h is an error term with zero conditional mean and zt is a k  1
vector with other standard risk factors.
A main issue in the estimation of equation (3.10) is data availability. First,
as Geanakoplos (2010) indicates, measures of aggregate margin are very hard to get
historically. Second, it may not be immediately clear which variable should be used to
represent  t: Third, data on xt, which measures the ratio of the aggregate consumption
due to the brave investor (and not simply aggregate consumption), is also not readily
available.
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With respect to the rst issue, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange provides data
on the margin requirements for the S&P 500 futures. If the capital constrained agent
can interchangeably trade spot and future contracts, and the spot and future markets
are good substitutes, margin requirements in future and spot markets should be tightly,
if not perfectly, related. Hence, under this assumption, we use the CME margin re-
quirements to construct mt. We compute the daily ratio between the initial margin
requirements on S&P 500 futures for members of the CME (available from April 1982)
and the value of the underlying S&P 500 index multiplied by the size of the contract.
This is the usual way of computing margins. Then we use the end-of-month mt.3
With respect to  t, the shadow price of capital, equation (3.5) says that in
equilibrium  t has to be equal to the spread between the uncollateralized and the
collateralized risk-free rates. In other words, it is a measure of how binding the capital
constraint is. The well-known ted spread is given by the di¤erence between the interest
rates on interbank loans (Libor) and American treasury bills and, because of that, it
is a widely observed indicator of credit conditions in nancial markets. Hence, it is a
natural choice to represent  t. The ted spread is computed as the di¤erence between
the 3-month libor rate and the 3-month treasury bill. For the libor rate we use the
Eurodollar 3-month deposit rate in the London market. Following the same convention
as for margins, we use the end-of-month ted spread.
Regarding xt; the problem of disaggregating consumption among di¤erent groups
of individuals is not new in the asset pricing literature. Since Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991), a number of papers have been trying to come up with measures for the con-
sumption of stockholders as a way to address the equity premium puzzle. Because
stockholdersconsumption covariates more with returns, such studies are able to gener-
3Using the beginning-of-month series gives qualitatively the same results.
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ate more reasonable risk aversion levels among other good results. Ait-Sahalia, Parker,
and Yogo (2004), for example, employ data on the consumption of luxury goods as a
proxy for stockholders consumption. More recently, Malloy, Moskowitz, and VISSING-
JØRGENSEN (2009) use microlevel household consumption data to approximate this
series.
It seems reasonable to employ one of these series to construct a measure for xt;
and we use the data of Malloy, Moskowitz, and VISSING-JØRGENSEN (2009) which is
publicly available. From their consumption growth rates, we compute xt in accordance
to equation (3.9). We impose B = 1, A = 10; and x0 = 27%; which are the values
employed by Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) in their analysis of the models predictions.4
However, as we discuss ahead, the presence of xt in the regressions is immaterial
for the results. This happens since xt accounts for a very small part in the variation of
the factor xtmt t.
Descriptive Statistics
Our nal data set consists of monthly observations for mt and  t from April
1982 to July 2011, and for xt from April 1982 to November 2004. The beginning of the
sample (April 1982) is in accordance to the beginning of the CME margin requirements.
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for m;  and x:
The sample correlation betweenmt and  t is only 14%. Notwithstanding, as Fig-
ure 1 illustrates, around periods of nancial distress both series usually go up (although
mt has a longer memory, i.e., it moves slower).
The product mt t and xt are presented in Figure 2: From the plot, it becomes
4We tested a number of alternative values for such parameters and the results su¤er no qualitative
change at all.
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clear that the important role in the empirical exercises will be played by mt t given
that xt is relatively constant.
Time-series regressions
We want to estimate equation (3.10). However, our proxy for xt is only available
until 2004. Fortunately we can exclude xt from our model with no harm, given that the
contribution of xt to the variation in xtmt t is extremely small (as Figure 2 illustrates).
To quantify this fact, we can compare the standard deviations of log (xtmt t) and
log (mt t).
5 While the log of xtmt t has standard error equal to 0.835, this is equal
to 0.834 for the log of mt t. To conrm the irrelevance of variable x; we estimated
equation (3.10), restricted to 1982-2004, with and without xt: Unreported results show
that x is indeed immaterial as expected.
Given that, the model we estimate to test implications (a) and (b) mentioned
above is
rt+h   rct+h = 0 + 1mt + 2 t + 3mt t + z0t4 + et+h: (3.11)
We include in zt some prominent variables explored in the predictability liter-
ature, one at a time. These are the earnings-price ratio, the dividend-price ratio, the
dividend yield, the market volatility, ination and the relative bill rate. These variables
are dened and computed as follows.
The earning price ration (e-p) is the log of earnings (12-month moving sum of
earnings on the S&P 500 index) minus the log of prices (S&P 500 index). The dividend
5Comparing the standard deviations without taking logs would be misleading since xt is always
below 1 and this would depress the variance of xtmt t per se. With additivity from logs this e¤ect
vanishes.
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price ratio (d-p) is the di¤erence between the log of dividends (12-month moving sums
of dividends paid on the S&P 500 index) and the log of prices. The dividend yield (d-y)
is the di¤erence between the log of dividends and the log of 12-month lagged prices.
The market volatility (vol) is the monthly average of squared daily returns on the S&P
500. Ination (inf) is the CPI ination. The relative bill rate (rrel) is di¤erence between
the 3-month treasury bill return and its 12-month moving average. Data on earnings,
dividends and returns are from Robert Shillers website. Ination and t-bill returns
come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis dataset.
Table 2 presents the estimation results of equation (3.11) for 12-, 18-, 24- and
48-month ahead excess returns respectively.6 The table is divided into 4 blocks, one
for each horizon. Each block reports the coe¢ cients of the margin requirements (1),
of the ted spread (2), and of the product between the margin and the ted spread (3);
along with their standard errors, column by column. Moreover, each block is divided
into seven rows. In the rst row, no control is added to the regression. Then, from
the second to the seventh row, the results are controlled for the indicated variables
individually. The coe¢ cients related to the control variables are not reported. The last
two columns (7 and 8) of the table present the marginal e¤ects of the ted spread and
of the margin requirement on future returns, respectively, 2 + 3m and 1 + 3 .
According to Table 2, the predictability results show up about the 24-month
horizon. This can be justied by the behavior of mt t; as illustrated in Figure 2. The
series spikes around periods of nancial distress and, once it spikes, it takes from 1.5 to
2 years to return to its low level. This characteristic, compatible to the idea of relative
brief periods of binding capital constraints, is what produces higher returns about 24
months after a spike in mt t (prices decrease when mt t spikes, and return about 24
6Equation (3.11) was estimated using annualized returns in %. The margin and the ted spread
(also annualized) were expressed in % as well.
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months later). Note that the the predictability power gets weak at the 48-month hori-
zon. This indicates that the 24-month horizon predictability is not an articial result
given by the well-known combination of overlapping returns with persistent regressors
(if this was the case, the predictability power would be increasing with the horizon).
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 2 quantify the marginal e¤ects when capital constraints
bind.7 They report the partial derivatives of equation (3.11) with respect to the margin
and the ted spread evaluated at  = 2:5% and m = 10%: The average values for these
variables are 0:7% and 4:7%; respectively, and the maximum values are 5.1% and 13.5%.
Therefore,  = 2:5% and m = 10% represent periods when the capital constraint is
restrictive.
The computations, using the 24-month horizon estimates, indicate that a 1%
raise in the margin requirement (ted spread) should depress stock prices in 2.3% (6.9%)
on average per year. These are the average marginal e¤ects across specications (across
the rows in the third block). The lowest marginal e¤ect of margin is 1.8% (when
controlled for inf or rrel) and the lowest marginal e¤ect of the ted spread is 2.7% (when
controlled for d-p).
These empirical results are favorable to implications (a) and (b). First, as the
marginal e¤ect estimates indicate, both the margin requirement on the market portfolio
and the respective margin cost do positively forecast future returns during periods of
nancial distress. Second, as the signicance of the product mt t conrms, the e¤ect
of one variable does depend on the level of the other one.
In the next sub-section, we turn to the investigation of the cross-sectional impli-
7Periods of binding capital constraints are the ones we are interested in because of two related
reasons. First, the theoretical model is about moments of binding capital constraints, i.e., when the
margin premium is relevant. Second, as Figure 2 indicates, our empirical identication should be
coming from a limited number of points in the sample, namely, the ones when the product between
margin and ted spread spikes.
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cations of the theoretical model.
3.3.2 Cross-sectional testable implications
The most direct way of testing the cross-sectional implications of equation (3.7)
would be by comparing the relation between risk-adjusted returns and margin require-
ments across di¤erent assets. Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), for instance, use the
spread between corporate bonds and credit default swaps, and the covered interest rate
parity to do that.
Unfortunately, given the di¢ culty in obtaining data on margin requirements
for individual securities, tests of this kind are restricted to isolated and individualized
examples as the two above.
However, it is still possible to promote an interesting confrontation of equation
(3.7) with data on the stock market, even with no data on individual margin require-
ments. We can do that by splitting the cross-sectional story under equation (3.7) into
two complementary parts. First, the model predicts that stocks with higher exposure
to  t (controlled for other risk factors) should pay on average higher returns. Second, it
says that a stocks exposure to  t is determined by its margin requirement. Both parts
are necessary conditions for the model to be valid. Together, they are su¢ cient. Given
that information on individual stock margin requirement is not publicly available, we
are not able to empirically address the second prediction. Nevertheless, we can test the
rst one.
Accordingly, in this sub-section, we investigate whether stocks with higher expo-
sure to  t (controlled for other risk factors) pay on average higher returns. As we will
see, we nd strong favorable evidence on this direction. Since this is only a necessary
condition for the model to be valid, our results, for being favorable, do not provide
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a conclusive empirical test for the model. However, the theoretical relation between
the exposure to  t and average returns, when controlled for other risk factors, is not a
trivial one. Moreover, such a relation has never been empirically documented before,
to the best of our knowledge. Given that, we see the following results as a relevant
empirical evidence in favor of Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) model.
It is important to mention that using individual stock data to test the model
in the cross-section only makes sense if margin requirements vary across stocks. By
analyzing private data from a large hedge fund, Ang, Gorovyy, and van Inwegen (2011)
report that this is indeed the case. According to their Table 1, margin requirements do
vary a lot across securities, going from 5% to 50%.
Constructing portfolios using constant margin-betas
We call the exposure of an asset return to  t by "margin-beta". We rst assume
a constant margin-beta, given by i: Under the model reasoning, this initial restriction
makes sense if individual margin requirements do not vary much over time.
We construct portfolios formed on the basis of stocksmargin-betas: Controlling
for other risk factors, in December of each year we estimate a pre-ranking i for every
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stock with share code 10 and 11 in the CRSP (Center
for Research in Security Prices of the University of Chicago) database, using ve years
of prior monthly returns.8 That is, in each December, for each security, we estimate
rei;t = 
0
F;iFt + i t + et; (3.12)
8Stocks that do not have information for the last 5 years are not included in the portfolios for the
following year. The average number of remaining stocks (permno) in each December is 3180 (from
2507 to 3461).
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where rei;t is the excess return of security i and the vector Ft contains a constant, the
3 Fama-French factors and a momentum factor (all these factors are from Kenneth
French web-site).
We then form ten equally weighted portfolios based on i and compute their
returns for the next twelve months. We repeat this process for each year from 1987
to 2009. The result is monthly returns on ten portfolios sorted on margin-betas from
January 1988 to December 2010.
Figure 3 reports the relation between the post-ranking margin-betas of the ten
portfolios and their average returns.9 The post-ranking betas are obtained by estimating
regression (3.12) over the whole sample period (January 1988 to December 2010).
The y-axis of Figure 3 presents the portfolios annualized average returns. As we
can see, there is a positive relation between margin-betas and average returns.10 This
is a rst favorable empirical evidence. However, returns on the y-axis are not controlled
for other risk-factors.
To investigate whether the margin-beta is priced in the presence of other risk
factors, we compute the portfolios alphas for the ten portfolios. The CAPM alpha
is computed with respect to risk factor related to the market excess return (MKT),
the 3-factor alpha with respect to the Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB, HML) and
the 4-factor alpha with respect to the Fama-French factors and the factor related to
momentum (MOM). That is,
9The estimated margin-betas are negative, since returns and ted spread have a contemporaneous
negative relation. We will report the results using the absolute value of the betas.
10The relation has a p-value equal to 0.012.
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rei;t = i;CAPM + i;MKTMKTt + e1;t
rei;t = i;3F + i;MKTMKTt + i;SMBSMBt + i;HMLHMLt + e2;t
rei;t = i;4F + i;MKTMKTt + i;SMBSMBt + i;HMLHMLt + i;MOMMOMt + e3;t
Table 3 presents the alphas and their t-statistics. We multiply the alphas by 12
to interpret them in terms of annualized returns. Portfolio number 1 has the stocks
with low margin-betas and portfolio number 10 has the stocks with high margin-betas.
So, if the margin-beta risk is priced, the premium for this risk should be positive, in
that alphas should increase with the portfolio number.
The evidence in Table 3 favors the pricing of the constant margin-beta. All three
alphas of the tenth portfolio are considerably higher than the ones of the rst portfolio.
Indeed, a "10 minus 1" spread, which goes long portfolio 10 and short portfolio 1 would
have a CAPM alpha equal to 2.6%, a 3-factor alpha equal to 2.8% and a 4-factor alpha
equal to 6.1% (these are simply the di¤erence between the alphas from portfolio 10
and 1). Moreover, the 4-factor alpha of the "10 minus 1" spread is signicant at 1%
(the 3-factor alpha is signicant at 10% and the CAPM alpha is not signicant). We
also test the hypothesis that all ten alphas are jointly equal to zero, using the test of
Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989). For all three models, the hypothesis is rejected at
a 1% signicance level.
Constructing portfolios using time-varying margin-betas
We now relax the assumption of a constant exposure to the ted spread: To do
that, we assume the margin-beta to be given by
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i;t = 0;i + 1;imt; (3.13)
where mt is the margin requirement for the market portfolio used in the previous sub-
section.
This approach to incorporating time-variation in betas was rst proposed by
Shanken (1990) and has been frequently used (see, for instance, Pastor and Stambaugh
(2001)). It is helpful whenever the researcher has a good idea on what may be causing
the time-variation on the factor exposure. This seems to be the case here, given that a
stocks exposure to  t should be determined by its margin requirement. Based on that,
equation (3.13) does possess some appeal ex ante. First, the constant will be capturing
the stable component of the individual margin as before. Second, the margin require-
ment on the market portfolio will account for a common time-variation in individual
margins given by some sort of aggregate tail risk. Note that we allow the loading on
the aggregate margin (1;i) to vary across stocks.







 t + et; (3.14)
and form ten equally weighted portfolios based on the predicted margin-betas, that is,
b0;i + b1;imDec (3.15)
wheremDec is the aggregate margin requirement in the respective December. As before,
we then compute the portfolios returns for the next twelve months and repeat this
process for each year from 1987 to 2010. The result is monthly returns on other ten
portfolios, now sorted on time-varying margin-betas.
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By estimating regression (3.14) over the whole sample period we can then com-





b0;i + b1;imt :
Figure 4 presents a signicant positive relation between the post-ranking average
time-varying margin-betas of the portfolios and their average returns (t = 5.74).11 Such
a relation is stronger under time-varying than under constant betas.
The better t of time-varying betas is conrmed by the analysis of the alphas.
Table 4 presents strong results in favor of the theoretical model. The alphas of the
three "10 minus 1" spreads are now even higher: the CAPM alpha is now 3.4%, the
3-factor alpha is 3.5% and the 4-factor alpha is 7.4%. They are all signicant at 5% (the
4-factor alpha is signicant at 1%). The test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989)
rejects the null hypothesis of all alphas equal to zero at a 1% signicance level.
The fact that we obtain stronger results under the time-varying beta should be
simply indicating that assuming constant margin requirements for individual stocks
may be somewhat restrictive.
3.4 Conclusion
In this study we provide favorable evidence for the existence of an aggregate
margin-related factor in the economy. As discussed in a recent literature, such a factor
may have important theoretical consequences that are not limited to the understanding
of asset prices. For instance, they may a¤ect monetary policy e¢ ciency during some
periods.
11As before, the betas are negative and we report the results using their absolute values.
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According to our results, during periods of nancial distress, both the margin
requirement on the market portfolio and the respective margin cost positively forecast
future returns. Moreover, the e¤ect of an increase in the margin cost depend on the level
of the margin and, at the same time, the e¤ect of an increase in margin requirements
should depend on the cost of buying on margin. These ndings conrm the the time-
series properties of the model by Garleanu and Pedersen (2011).
With respect to the cross-section of the returns, the theoretical model predicts
that stocks with higher exposure to the ted spread (controlled for other risk factors)
should pay on average higher returns. We test test this fact and, as before, nd favorable
empirical evidence.
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3.5 Tables and Figures
Figure 3.1: Figure 1. Margin requirement and ted spread.
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Figure 3.2: Figure 2. The margin factor (margin time the ted spread) and the risk-
bearing capacity of the brave agent (x).
141
Figure 3.3: Figure 3. Constant margin-beta sorted portfolios (average returns x margin-
betas)
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Figure 3.4: Figure 4. Time-varying margin-beta sorted portfolios (average returns x
average margin-betas)
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
mean min max std. dev. correl. m correl. Ψ correl. x
margin (m) 4.7% 1.9% 13.5% 2.0% 1
ted spread (ψ) 0.7% 0.1% 5.1% 0.6% 14% 1
consumption ratio (x) 27.7% 27.0% 28.3% 0.3% 35% -15% 1
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Table 3.2: Predictive regressions (equation 11)
δ1 σ(δ1) δ2 σ(δ2) δ3 σ(δ3) δ1+δ3ψ δ2+δ3m
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
no control -1.529 (1.872) -6.190 (10.23) 1.185 (1.137)
e-p -0.248 (1.967) -10.07 (10.25) 1.104 (1.173)
d-p -0.643 (1.688) -12.13 (9.786) 1.194 (1.108)
d-y 0.0350 (1.639) -11.06 (10.19) 1.225 (1.165)
vol -1.622 (1.863) -7.964 (10.02) 1.652 (1.231)
inf -1.345 (1.862) -4.537 (9.553) 0.895 (1.069)
rrel -1.362 (1.789) -5.126 (9.910) 1.106 (1.124)
no control -2.100 (1.938) -9.112 (7.177) 1.622* (0.952) 2.1% 7.1%
e-p -1.153 (1.932) -12.18 (7.523) 1.579 (0.991) 2.8% 3.6%
d-p -1.134 (1.773) -14.54** (6.850) 1.574* (0.917) 2.8% 1.2%
d-y -0.330 (1.848) -13.07* (7.208) 1.515 (0.966)
vol -2.200 (1.925) -10.86 (7.272) 2.081* (1.113) 3.0% 10.0%
inf -2.030 (1.954) -8.546 (7.052) 1.521 (0.955)
rrel -1.972 (1.920) -8.371 (7.111) 1.561* (0.945) 1.9% 7.2%
no control -2.804 (1.952) -9.500* (5.365) 1.835** (0.866) 1.8% 8.9%
e-p -1.927 (1.913) -14.68** (5.690) 1.978** (0.898) 3.0% 5.1%
d-p -1.617 (1.964) -13.93*** (5.110) 1.660* (0.876) 2.5% 2.7%
d-y -0.855 (2.168) -12.31** (5.548) 1.574* (0.937) 3.1% 3.4%
vol -2.845 (1.944) -10.32* (5.715) 2.052** (1.014) 2.3% 10.2%
inf -2.819 (1.955) -9.600* (5.447) 1.853** (0.890) 1.8% 8.9%
rrel -2.823 (1.992) -9.604* (5.329) 1.844** (0.875) 1.8% 8.8%
no control -3.454** (1.564) -5.381 (4.907) 1.461* (0.819) 0.2% 9.2%
e-p -2.642 (1.731) -9.384 (6.191) 1.405 (0.901)
d-p -1.869 (1.758) -9.577** (4.782) 1.054 (0.858)
d-y -1.460 (1.992) -7.298 (5.382) 0.880 (0.974)
vol -3.446** (1.547) -5.486 (5.197) 1.488 (0.937)
inf -3.465** (1.576) -5.538 (5.019) 1.475* (0.834) 0.2% 9.2%
rrel -3.653** (1.571) -6.484 (4.432) 1.610** (0.775) 0.4% 9.6%
marginal effectsestimated parameters from equation (11)
Notes: Blocks 1 to 4 report results from monthly predictive regressions of S&P 500 excess returns
over 12-, 18-, 24- and 48-month horizons, respectively, for the period between April 1982 to June
2011 (equation 11). Each block reports the coefficients and standard errors of the S&P 500 futures
margin requirements (columns 1 and 2), of the ted spread (columns 3 and 4), and of the product
between the margin and the ted spread (columns 5 and 6). Rows of each block report the
estimates described above from regressions controlled for the following variables, respectively:
earnings-price ratio (e-p), dividend-price ratio (d-p), dividend yield (d-y), monthly average of
the daily squared returns of the S&P 500 (vol), CPI inflation (inf) and relative bill rate (rrel). Such
variables are computed according to Goyal and Welch (2008) (rrel is in accordance to Lettau and
Ludvigson 2001). Columns 7 and 8 report the marginal effects of a 1% increase in the margin
(fixing the ted spread at 2.5%) and of a 1% increase in the ted spread (fixing the margin at 10%)
on future returns. Standard errors are computed by Newey-West with lag length equal to the






























Table 3.3: Alphas on portfolios sorted on constant margin-betas
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CAPM alpha 4.5% 5.2% 5.4% 6.0% 4.6% 4.2% 4.6% 7.0% 6.0% 7.1%
(1.25) (2.30) (2.63) (3.19) (2.53) (2.01) (2.17) (2.78) (1.94) (1.54)
3-factor alpha 2.1% 2.5% 2.7% 3.4% 2.3% 1.4% 2.0% 4.3% 3.5% 5.0%
(0.95) (1.95) (2.50) (2.80) (1.99) (1.12) (1.55) (2.83) (1.70) (1.58)
4-factor alpha 4.1% 3.9% 4.0% 5.0% 3.6% 3.6% 4.3% 7.3% 7.2% 10.3%
(1.51) (2.68) (3.18) (4.58) (3.28) (2.88) (3.83) (4.69) (3.26) (2.84)
Portfolios
At each year-end between 1987 and 2009, eligible stocks are sorted into 10 portfolios according to constant margin-betas.
The constant margin-betas are the given by the OLS coefficient of stocks returns on the ted spread, controlled for 4 other
risk factors, namely, the 3 Fama-French factors and a momentum factor. The estimation and sorting procedure at each year-
end uses only data available at that time. Eligible stocks are defined as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX,
or NASDAQ with five years of monthly returns continuing through the current year-end. The portfolio returns for the 12
postranking months are linked across years to form one series of post-ranking returns for each decile. The table reports the
decile portfolios' post-ranking alphas, in percent per year. The alphas are estimated as intercepts from the regressions of
excess portfolio post-ranking returns on excess market returns (CAPM alpha), on the Fama-French factor returns (3-factor
alpha), and on the Fama-French and momentum factor returns (4-factor alphas). The t-statistics are in parentheses.
.
Table 3.4: Alphas on portfolios sorted on time-varying margin-betas.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
CAPM alpha 4.6% 5.5% 5.2% 4.3% 4.8% 5.4% 4.5% 5.6% 6.6% 8.0%
(1.28) (2.35) (2.49) (2.30) (2.70) (2.82) (2.07) (2.28) (2.12) (1.77)
3-factor alpha 2.3% 2.7% 2.6% 1.7% 2.6% 2.9% 1.8% 2.9% 4.2% 5.8%
(1.09) (2.05) (2.09) (1.68) (2.50) (2.48) (1.33) (1.90) (2.05) (1.75)
4-factor alpha 3.9% 4.3% 4.2% 3.3% 3.9% 4.7% 4.3% 5.7% 7.7% 11.3%
(1.71) (3.27) (3.33) (3.40) (3.95) (3.93) (3.06) (3.59) (3.31) (2.78)
Portfolios
At each year-end between 1987 and 2009, eligible stocks are sorted into 10 portfolios according to predicted time-varying
margin-betas, which are computed according to equation 14. The estimation and sorting procedure at each year-end uses
only data available at that time. Eligible stocks are defined as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ with five years of monthly returns continuing through the current year-end. The portfolio returns for the 12
postranking months are linked across years to form one series of post-ranking returns for each decile. The table reports the
decile portfolios' post-ranking alphas, in percent per year. The alphas are estimated as intercepts from the regressions of
excess portfolio post-ranking returns on excess market returns (CAPM alpha), on the Fama-French factor returns (3-factor
alpha), and on the Fama-French and momentum factor returns (4-factor alphas). The t-statistics are in parentheses.
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A.1 Complete List of Equations
The equations below describe the dynamic equilibrium in the private sector, the
interest rate rule, the government budget constraint and the balance sheet of govern-
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B.1 Complete List of Equations
The model has 14 variables representing quantities (Ct; CH;t; CF;t; CH ;t, YH;t
Lt; Kt; It; In;t; IH;t; IF;t; SK;t, Nt, Bt ), 12 real prices and rates (Rt, wt, pw;t, pH;t, st,
Qt, , RS;t, RD;t, RK;t, Rw;t, 	t , 

t ), 3 nominal variables (it, H;t;t) and 8 auxiliary
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(1 + it) = RtEtt+1 (B.26)
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